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INTERROGATING THE NONINCORPORATION OF THE

GRAND JURY CLAUSE
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.t

With the Supreme Court's recent incorporation-inRamos v. Louisiana-of
the Sixth Amendment's jury unanimity requirement to apply to the states, the
project of "totalincorporation"is all but complete in the criminalprocedurecontext.
Virtually every core criminalproceduralprotection in the Bill of Rights has been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
constrain not only the federalgovernment, but also the states-with one exception.
The Fifth Amendment's grand jury right now stands alone as the only federal
criminalproceduralright the Supreme Court has permitted states to ignore. In one
of the earliest incorporationdecisions following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Courtheld that the right to grandjury indictment enshrinedin the
Fifth Amendment was not a requisite of due process and, therefore, could be
dispensed with in state criminal proceedings. The decision, which predated the
Court's selective incorporationjurisprudence that eventually applied every other
criminalproceduralright to the states, triggereda rapiddecline in the prestige of the
grandjury in American legal culture over more than a century. More recently, the
grand jury justifiably has come under fire for its role in the shameful trend of
decisions in tragic cases involving police killings of African Americans, fueling calls
for the abolition of the grand jury altogether. Despite the significant headwinds
facing the grandjury, however, there are critical and impactful rolesfor it to play in
the protection of individual liberty, in the infusion of community wisdom into the
criminal process, and in the pursuit of important societal goals, including racial
justice. This Article argues that it is time to interrogatethe nonincorporationof the
grandjury right, applying the touchstones of modern incorporationjurisprudence,
including history, constitutional logic, and-despite criticisms of its value and
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efficacy-policy considerations animated by the grand jury's enduring relevance
and its prospective impact in the criminal legal system and beyond.
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INTRODUCTION

With the Supreme Court's recent incorporation, in Ramos v.
Louisiana, of the Sixth Amendment's jury unanimity requirement to
apply to the states, the aim of total incorporation in the criminal
procedural rights context is all but complete.1 Virtually every core
criminal procedural protection in the Bill of Rights-from the right to
a petit jury to the protection against excessive fines-has been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to constrain not only the federal government, but also the
states-with one exception. In Hurtadov. California(1884), one of the
earliest incorporation decisions following the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the right to grand jury
indictment enshrined in the Fifth Amendment was not a requisite of
due process and, therefore, could be dispensed with in state criminal
proceedings.2
This new regime inexorably altered the picture of state
administration of criminal justice, permitting states to lodge power to
force an individual to answer to serious criminal charges with an
individual prosecutor or magistrate judge, rather than a grand jury.
Hurtado resulted in diminished respect for the usefulness and value of
the grand jury in the federal and state systems alike. For nearly 140 years
since the decision, the American legal culture has treated the grand jury
protection as a legal fiction-a mere procedural speedbump in the
criminal legal process. At the same time, in recent years, the grand jury
has come under fire for its failings in cases involving police officers who

1 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).

2 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
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have killed African Americans in the line of duty.3 This troubling
trend-seen in the grand jury declinations in the cases involving officers
who killed Breonna Taylor, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, and Eric
Garner-even has led to characterizations of the grand jury as an
obstacle to racial justice and prompted calls for its abolition.4
Despite these headwinds-and against the odds-the grand jury
has endured as a significant, if not enigmatic, feature of the American
criminal legal system, with grand jury indictment still required as a
matter of state law for serious offenses in nearly half of the fifty states,
and throughout the federal system under the Fifth Amendment.5 The
grand jury is unique in our legal culture. It features a body of laypeople
who, working in secret and ostensibly insulated from popular passions,
external influence, or governmental control,6 are equipped with the
ability to inject popular wisdom into the machinery of the criminal legal
system. The grand jury, properly understood, is more than a protection
for the defendant; it is an expression of the community's authority to

influence the initiation of proceedings leading toward one of the State's
most solemn and intrusive activities-the deprivation of life or liberty.
This function of the grand jury is not distinct from the individual liberty
interests that animate Bill of Rights and incorporation jurisprudence;
rather it is intertwined with those interests. The community's
participation in state criminal justice machinery, like with the petit jury,
is the defendant's right. They are one in the same.
Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court deployed its theory of selective
incorporation to apply to the states every single other criminal
procedural right in the Bill of Rights, the grand jury has been left in a
sort of jurisprudential limbo. Although the Supreme Court held in 1884
7
that the grand jury right was not incorporated to apply to the states,

3 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The GrandJury and Police Violence Against Black Men, in
POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 210 (Angela

J. Davis ed.,

2017).
4 See, e.g., id. at 210, 228; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The GrandJury's Role in the Prosecution of
Unjustified Police Killings-Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 410-11
(2017) [hereinafter Fairfax, GrandJury's Role]; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Should the American Grand
Jury Survive Ferguson?, 58 How. L.J. 825, 826 & n.8 (2015) [hereinafter Fairfax, Grand Jury
Survive].
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1); Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1435 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6 See 2 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:15 (2d ed. 2020); Kate

Levine, How We Prosecute the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 745, 753 (2016). But see, e.g., Fairfax, Grand
Jury's Role, supra note 4, at 408-09 (noting the "[o]utsized [r]ole" played by the prosecutor in
many grand juries).
7 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
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this decision predated the era of selective incorporation and employed
logic that the Court later rejected when incorporating other criminal
procedure rights. Consequently, the legal culture has vacillated between
full embrace of the grand jury to treating it with outright contempt.
Now, with all other Bill of Rights criminal procedural protections
having been incorporated, it may be time to decide once and for all
whether the grand jury deserves enough respect to require states to
utilize it, or whether it should be jettisoned altogether.8
This Article interrogates the nonincorporation of the right to
grand jury indictment. Part I traces the arc of Supreme Court
incorporation doctrine, illuminating the dialectic between the
"fundamental fairness," selective incorporation, and the total
incorporation approaches, and mining a taxonomy of "incorporation
touchstones" set forth in modern incorporation cases. Part I
demonstrates that although the selective incorporation approach won
the initial jurisprudential battle, the total incorporation approach is on
the verge of winning the war in the context of criminal procedural
rights. Part II scrutinizes the Supreme Court's nineteenth-century
decision not to incorporate the grand jury right to apply to the states,
illuminating the ruling's flawed methodology and assumptions and
characterizing the decision as an example of "pragmatic procedural
federalism" rather than pure constitutional analysis. In Part III, this
Article interrogates the contemporary case for incorporation of the
grand jury right, examining the merits of the incorporation of the grand
jury with reference to the modern incorporation touchstonesincluding history, constitutional logic, and policy considerations. Part
III applies those touchstones and seeks to answer the central question
regarding the case for incorporation of the grand jury right: whether the
grand jury right-and, by extension, the grand jury itself-is worth
keeping, much less imposing on the states. This Part considers the
grand jury right as a matter of normative policy, with particular
attention paid to the enduring relevance of the grand jury, and new
challenges to the grand jury's standing in the wake of disappointing
outcomes in cases such as those involving the police killings of Breonna
Taylor, Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and others.

HANDBOOK OF PROSECUTORS AND PROSECUTION 59, 65 (Ronald F. Wright, Kay L. Levine

&

8 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1435 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("If we took the same approach to the
Hurtado question that the majority takes in this case, the holding in that case could be called into
question."). A number of other scholars have considered the place of the grand jury right among
other nonincorporated rights. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Testing Charges, in THE OXFORD
Russell M. Gold eds., 2021); F. Andrew Hessick & Elizabeth Fisher, Structural Rights and
Incorporation,71 ALA. L. REv. 163, 205-06 (2019); Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation:The Bill
of Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 159, 185-89 (2012).
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THE ARC OF INCORPORATION DOCTRINE

A.

Trans-SubstantivePrinciples

The Bill of Rights, ratified in 1791, initially constrained only the
9
power of the federal government. However, the Civil War and the

subsequent amendments to the U.S. Constitution altered the
10
relationship between the federal government and the states. After the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were questions

regarding whether the constraints on government power found in the
first ten amendments to the Constitution were binding on the various
states. In other words, would the Bill of Rights be incorporated through
the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states? Two provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment were particularly relevant-the Privileges

and Immunities Clause"l and the Due Process Clause.12
Although there has been debate over whether the Privileges and
Immunities Clause provides an alternative-and, as some have argued,
3
exclusive-basis for applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states,1 it
is the Due Process Clause that has been embraced by the Court as the
14
vehicle for incorporation of Bill of Rights provisions to the states.
1.

Baseline Features of Incorporation Doctrine

In McDonald v. City of Chicago,15 which held that the Second
Amendment's right to bear arms was incorporated to apply to the states,
9 E.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833); Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469,
551-52 (1833) ("[I]t is now settled that [the amendments in the Bill of Rights] do not extend to
the states."); Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) ("When ratified in 1791, the Bill of
Rights applied only to the Federal Government.").
10 See, e.g., Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 754 (2010)
("The constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War fundamentally
altered our country's federal system.").
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 4 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."). See generally Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
13 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754-59. But see, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1423-25 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (rooting for incorporation of the right to jury unanimity in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
14 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 754-59 ("For many decades, the question of the rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringement has been analyzed under the
Due Process Clause of that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.").
15 561 U.S. 742.
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the Court illuminated several features animating the arc of its
jurisprudence regarding whether the Fourteenth Amendment
constrained states from infringing liberties found in the Bill of Rights.
First, the Court declared that it had "viewed the due process question as
entirely separate from the question whether a right was a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship."16
Next, the Court noted that its determination of whether a
particular right was incorporated to apply to the states through the Due
Process Clause was not a function of whether the right was found in the
Bill of Rights.17 Rather, the inquiry was whether the nature of the right
was such that it would be "included in the conception of due process of
law."18 The term "due process," the McDonald Court explained, had
been defined in various ways. In its 1908 case, Twining v. New Jersey,19
the Court had explained due process as "immutable principles of justice
which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of
the Union may disregard."20 The Court had, in its 1934 case, Snyder v.
Massachusetts,21 attached to due process those rights "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people so as to be ranked as
fundamental."22 Just a few years later, the Court, in Palko v.
Connecticut,23 referenced "those rights that are "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" and essential to "a fair and enlightened
system of justice."24
The third feature of the incorporation doctrine noted in McDonald
was the Court periodically "having asked, when inquiring into whether
some particular procedural safeguard was required of a State, if a
civilized system could be imagined that would not accord the particular
protection."25 This "civilized system" inquiry, the McDonald Court
explained, led the Court to hold that the Due Process Clause
incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause in its 1897 case,

16 Id. at 759 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908)).
17 Id. at 760 ("While it was 'possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first
eight Amendments against National action [might] also be safeguarded against state
action' ... this was 'not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99)).
18 Id. at 759 (quoting Twining, 211 U.S. at 99).
19 211 U.S. 78.
20 Id. at 102 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)).
21 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
22 Id. at 105.

23 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
24 Id. at 325.

25 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968)).
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Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago,26 because the protection
against government taking of private property without just
compensation is "a principle of natural equity, recognized by all

temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense
of its justice."27 By that same token, the Court had determined in
Twining that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination was not
a requisite of due process, as the right "has no place in the jurisprudence

of civilized and free countries outside the domain of the common
law."28

The McDonald Court also highlighted that the rights contained in
the Bill of Rights had no special status in its incorporation
jurisprudence.29 In other words, the Court had demonstrated that it had
no qualms about excluding from the confines of the Due Process Clause

a particular right found in the Bill of Rights. Thus, as the McDonald
Court pointed out, although the First Amendment's free speech, free

press, free assembly, and free religion provisions and the Sixth
Amendment's assistance of counsel protection were deemed to be
included within due process-and therefore incorporated,30 the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against incrimination and the right to grand
31
jury indictment were not.
The final feature of incorporation jurisprudence amplified in
McDonald is that rights that were incorporated through the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause to apply to the states did not
necessarily apply equally, or in the same manner that they applied to

the federal government. 32 One cited example of this phenomenon was
the Court's 1942 decision in Betts v. Brady,33 in which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel-which applied in all federal criminal
cases-was incorporated to apply only in state cases in which "want of
counsel . .. result[ed] in a conviction lacking in such fundamental

fairness."34 Also in 1949, the Court, in Wolf v. Colorado,35 incorporated

26 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
27 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760 (quoting Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 238).
28 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113 (1908).
29 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761.
30 See id. (first citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (freedom of speech and
press); then citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (freedom of speech
and press); then citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (assistance of counsel in capital
cases); then citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); and then
citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion)).
31 Id. (citing Twining, 211 U.S. at 113; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)).
32 Id.
33 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

34 Id. at 473.
35 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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the Fourth Amendment, which it deemed to be a requisite of due
process, to apply to the states, but it declined to incorporate the
exclusionary rule.36
2.

Total Incorporation

Justice Hugo Black subscribed to the theory that all of the
protections in the Bill of Rights were incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 As Justice Black wrote in his lengthy dissent
in Adamson v. California:
I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation
the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold that this Court
can determine what, if any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be
enforced, and if so to what degree, is to frustrate the great design of
a written Constitution.38

This theory of "total" or "complete" incorporation was a marked
departure from the selective incorporation approach that would soon
emerge. 39 Although Justice Black never persuaded a majority of the
Court, at the end of the day, he recognized that his theory may have lost
the battle, but ultimately won the war:
I want to emphasize that I believe as strongly as ever that the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights
applicable to the States. I have been willing to support the selective

incorporation doctrine, however, as an alternative, although perhaps
less historically supportable than complete incorporation. The

selective incorporation process, if used properly, does limit the
Supreme Court in the Fourteenth Amendment field to specific Bill
of Rights' protections only and keeps judges from roaming at will in
their own notions of what policies outside the Bill of Rights are

36 Id. at 27-28.
37 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 761-62. Justice Black argued forcefully throughout his
tenure that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to
overturn Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), and incorporate all of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights, but he also analyzed incorporation more broadly under the Due Process Clause. See,
e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162-71 (1968) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruledin part by Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
38 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
39 Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter had heated rhetorical battles over the merits of the
total incorporation theory. See, e.g., Justin Collings, The Supreme Court and the Memory of Evil,
71 STAN. L. REV. 265, 294-97 (2019); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of
ConstitutionalLaw, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1012 (1998).
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desirable and what are not. And, most importantly for me, the
selective incorporation process has the virtue of having already
worked to make most of the Bill of Rights' protections applicable to
the States.

40

3.

Selective Incorporation

By the 1960s, the selective incorporation doctrine with which

Justice Black eventually made his peace had come to define the Court's
approach. Unlike its halting approach in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century, the Court, by the 1960s, consistently and
methodically incorporated Bill of Rights protections to apply to the
states. 41 This was particularly so in the criminal procedure area, in
which the Court incorporated the right to counsel,42 the right to jury
trial,43 the right to a speedy trial," the privilege against selfincrimination,45 the right of confrontation,46 the right to compulsory
48
process, 47 the warrant requirement, the exclusionary rule,49 and the

protection against double jeopardy.50 Notably, a number of these
decisions overruled or otherwise departed from previous decisions not
to incorporate rights.5'
In addition to incorporating nearly all of the protections in the Bill
of Rights,52 by the 1960s, the Court also had sharpened its definition of
40 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 171 (Black, J., concurring).
41 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 763.
42 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-42 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942).
43 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-48.
44 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
45 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78
(1908).
46 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965).
47 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).
48 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
49 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
50 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
51 See, e.g., id.; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1964), overruling Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady,
316 U.S. 455 (1942); cf. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (characterizing as dicta
statements in prior decisions that jury trial right is not a requisite of due process).
52 See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) ("With only 'a handful' of exceptions, this
Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the
protections contained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States."); McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 (2010) ("The Court eventually incorporated almost all of
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what qualified a particular right for incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Gone was the notion that the Court would
judge a right's incorporation-worthiness-as it had done in Hurtado
with the grand jury-by whether, in the abstract, a "civilized system
[can] be imagined that would not accord the particular protection."s3
Rather, the inquiry was to be whether the protection was one of the
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our [American] civil and political institutions,"54 is "basic in our
[American] system of jurisprudence,"55 is "a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial,"56 and is "fundamental to the American scheme
of justice."57
Additionally, by the 1960s, the Court had "decisively held that
incorporated Bill of Rights protections 'are all to be enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal
encroachment."'58 This was a repudiation of the "dual-track"
incorporation theory espoused by Justice Powell.59 The dual-track
approach implicitly endorsed "the notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the States only a 'watered-down, subjective
version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,"'60 in which
the Court applied rights in different ways "depending on whether the
claim was asserted in a state or federal court."61 However, the dual-track
view never commanded a majority of the Court and had never been
embraced in its jurisprudence.62 Thus, today, all of the criminal
the provisions of the Bill of Rights."); id. at 764 n.12 (collecting cases); see also id. at 765 ("Only
a handful of the Bill of Rights protections remain unincorporated."); id. at 765 n.13 (collecting
cases).
53 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14 (noting that "recent cases applying provisions of the first
eight Amendments to the States represent a new approach to the 'incorporation' debate").
54 Id. at 148 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
55 Id. at 149 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
56 Id. (first quoting Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-44; then quoting Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6; and then
quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)).
57 Id. ("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee.").
58 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010) (quoting Malloy, 387 U.S. at 10).
59 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1398 (2020) ("Justice Powell doubled down on his
belief in 'dual-track' incorporation-the idea that a single right can mean two different things
depending on whether it is being invoked against the federal or a state government.").
60 Malloy, 387 U.S. at 10-11; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765.
61 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 (quoting Malloy, 387 U.S. 10-11).
62 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1398 & n.32 (noting that the dual-track view had been rejected by
the Court, including in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019)); see also Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 395-96 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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procedural protections in the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated
63
apply in equal measure in the state and federal systems.

B.

Modern IncorporationTouchstones

Very recently, the Court had the opportunity to affirm the current
state of incorporation doctrine in the context of two criminal casesTimbs v. Indiana (2019)64 and Ramos v. Louisiana (2020).65 Both cases
illuminate the Court's current thinking on incorporation doctrine,
particularly in the context of criminal procedural protections.
Importantly, they provide guideposts for how the Court might analyze
the case for incorporation of the only remaining core criminal

procedural protection found in the Bill of Rights-the right to grand
jury indictment.66

63 See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687 ("Incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees are enforced against
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those
personal rights against federal encroachment. Thus, if a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated,
there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires." (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)). It should be noted that, until the Court's decision in
Ramos, there was one remaining right that was applied differently in state and federal courts. In
Apodaca v. Oregon, the Court declined to incorporate the jury unanimity requirement to apply
to the states, despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right had been incorporated.
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390. Apodaca was a
fractured decision, and the result permitting states to ignore the unanimity requirement was not
universally viewed as "an endorsement of the two-track approach to incorporation." McDonald,
561 U.S. at 766 n.14; see also Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 687 n.l. In any event, in Ramos, the Court
overturned Apodaca and held that the Sixth Amendment's jury unanimity requirement applies
to state proceedings, thus incorporating the jury right in its entirety, with an identical application
in state and federal courts. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1408.

&

64 139 S. Ct. 682.
65 140 S. Ct. 1390.
66 It is now settled that the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment has been
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states. See McDonald, 561 U.S.
at 764 & n.12. However, the Court has never explicitly held this. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi
Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment
Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87
TEX. L. REV. 7, 82 (2008) ("It can be argued that the Supreme Court signaled its willingness to
incorporate [the right against excessive bail] against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1971, although it has not technically done so thus far."). In its 1971 case, Schilb v.
Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), the Court stated in dictum that "the Eighth Amendment's
proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 365. Although some courts assumed this dictum signaled that
the Excessive Bail Clause had been incorporated, see, e.g., United States v. Juanico, No. CR 143095, 2015 WL 10383206, at *6 n.1 (D.N.M. Dec. 16, 2015), aff'd, 658 F. App'x 906 (10th Cir.
2016) ("The Supreme Court has incorporated the Excessive Bail Clause's substantive safeguards
against the states."), others did not. See, e.g., Martin v. Diguglielmo, 644 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618
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After McDonald, which-as discussed above-updated the Court's
articulation of its incorporation doctrine, nearly another decade would
pass before the Court took the opportunity to address one of the
"handful of the Bill of Rights protections
[that] remain
unincorporated."67 Of these five remaining unincorporated rights, only
two-the Third Amendment's quartering of soldiers provision and the
Seventh Amendment's civil jury trial provision-were not related to the
criminal process. 68 Of the other three unincorporated criminal
procedural protections, the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause and
the Sixth Amendment's jury unanimity requirement had been
determined by the Court not to be incorporated to apply to the states. 69
Thus, only the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause had not
been addressed previously by the Court.
1.

Timbs v. Indiana (2019)

The Court took up the Excessive Fines Clause in the 2019 case of
Timbs v. Indiana.70 Timbs involved a defendant who was sentenced to
home detention, probation, and payment of fees and costs after
pleading guilty to narcotics distribution and conspiracy charges in an

(W.D. Pa. 2008) ("To the best of this Court's knowledge, the Supreme Court of the United States
has never held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive bail applies to the States via
the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause.").
However, in its 2010 McDonald v. City of Chicago decision, the Supreme Court clarified its
position that the Excessive Bail provision had been incorporated-by including it in a footnote
listing previously incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764
n.12 (listing the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eight Amendment among rights that have been
incorporated).
67 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 & n.13.
68 See id. at 765 n.13. Although the Excessive Fines Clause also applies to civil forfeiture
proceedings, these are often parallel to, or in connection with, criminal proceedings. See, e.g.,
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686 ("Like the Eighth Amendment's proscriptions of 'cruel and unusual
punishment' and '[e]xcessive bail,' the protection against excessive fines guards against abuses of
government's punitive or criminal-law-enforcement authority." (alteration in original)); id. at
687 ("Directly at issue here is the phrase 'nor excessive fines imposed,' which 'limits the
government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, "as punishment for some
offense.""' (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998)) (internal quotations
and citations omitted)). Indiana attempted to have the Court reconsider its prior decision in
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993), in which it held unanimously that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to civil in rem forfeitures if such forfeitures "are at least partially punitive."
Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689. The Court declined to revisit Austin because the State had not properly
raised the question before the Court. Id. at 690.
69 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390; Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13.
70 139 S. Ct. 682.
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Indiana state court. 71 The State brought a civil suit against the defendant

for the forfeiture of a Land Rover vehicle the defendant had purchased
with money unrelated to his criminal conduct but that, as the State

persuaded the state court, was used to commit the crimes. However, the
state court concluded that the $42,000 value of the vehicle was so much
greater than the maximum $10,000 monetary fine for the defendant's
crime of conviction that a forfeiture "would be grossly disproportionate
to the gravity of Timbs's offense, hence unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."72 The Indiana Supreme

Court reversed, holding "that "the Excessive Fines Clause constrains
only federal action and is inapplicable to state impositions."73
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, reaffirmed

the modern understanding of the state of incorporation doctrine set
forth in McDonald a decade earlier. The Court reiterated that the

touchstone is not whether a protection conceivably could be absent
from a rational system of justice in the abstract; rather, it is whether the
protection is essential to the American tradition. As Justice Ginsburg
wrote, "A Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, we have explained,

if it is 'fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,' or 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition."'74 The Court also reminded that
the "dual-track" incorporation theory had no traction in its
jurisprudence:
Incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees are "enforced against the
States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same
standards that protect those personal rights against federal
encroachment." Thus, if a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated,

there is no daylight between the federal and state conduct it prohibits
75
or requires.
Against this backdrop, the Court traced the "venerable lineage" of
the Excessive Fines Clause back to the thirteenth century's Magna
Carta,76 which ultimately proved ineffective in preventing the
monarchical use of "large fines to raise revenue, harass their political

foes, and indefinitely detain those unable to pay."77 The subsequent
English Bill of Rights provision "that 'excessive Bail ought not to be
required,

nor excessive

Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual

Id. at 686.
Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 687 (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767).
75 Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 688.
71

72
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Punishments inflicted,"'78 would inspire not only the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, but also similar
guarantees in colonial compacts and state constitutions at the time of
the founding.79
By the postbellum era, the Court noted, constitutional excessive
fines provisions were found in all but two of the thirty-seven states.80
The need for that protection was made more acute during the
Reconstruction Era as Southern states enacted Black Codes, one
common feature of which was to impose "draconian fines for violating
broad proscriptions on 'vagrancy' and other dubious offenses,"81 and
then "[w]hen newly freed slaves were unable to pay imposed fines,

States often demanded involuntary labor instead."82 Indeed, as the
Court explained, this Southern use of fines to reinstate conditions of
slavery was a key concern of Congress when debating the Fourteenth
Amendment.83
Noting that evidence of the fundamental nature of the protection
against excessive fines can be found in the fact that, today, every single
state has such a constitutional provision,84 the Court then turned from
mining history to extolling the logic behind the right, observing that
without this protection, excessive fines can be weaponized for purposes
of political retribution or unfairly supplementing state coffers without
political scrutiny.85 The Court concluded that "the historical and logical
case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the
Excessive Fines Clause is overwhelming. Protection against excessive
punitive economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, to repeat, both
'fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty' and 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition."'86 This was made clear as the basis
78

Id. (citing English Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. ch. 2, § 10, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 441 (1689)).

79 Id.

80 Id. ("An even broader consensus obtained in 1868 upon ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. By then, the constitutions of 35 of the 37 States-accounting for over 90% of the
U.S. population-expressly prohibited excessive fines." (citing Calabresi & Agudo, supra note 66,
at 82)).
81 Id. at 688-89.
82 Id. at 689; Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth
Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 681-85 (2003).
83 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 689 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1866)).
84

Id.

85 Id.

86 Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010)). The Court also
rejected Indiana's argument "that the Excessive Fines Clause cannot be incorporated if it applies
to civil in rem forfeitures." Id. at 690. Indiana's position was that the specific application of the
Excessive Fines Clause to civil in rem forfeitures "is neither fundamental nor deeply rooted." Id.
at 689. Noting that Indiana's argument "is inconsistent with the approach we have taken in cases
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for the holding that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause is

incorporated to apply to the states: "This safeguard, we hold, is
'fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,' with 'dee[p] root[s] in

[our] history and tradition.' The Excessive Fines Clause is therefore
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."87
2.

Ramos v. Louisiana (2020)

After the Timbs Court incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause,
only two unincorporated criminal procedural rights remained-the
Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment and the Sixth

Amendment right to jury unanimity in criminal cases-and both
previously had been considered for incorporation by the Court some
ninety years apart.88 As the Court reconsidered jury unanimity in

Ramos v. Louisiana,89 it had a clear modern articulation of its
incorporation framework to apply-whether, as a matter of history,
tradition, logic, and policy, the right was fundamental to the American
scheme of justice. However, as the Court previously had permitted
nonunanimous state verdicts to stand,90 the Ramos Court also was

confronted with the doctrine of stare decisis.91
In Ramos, the petitioner had been convicted of a serious offense by
a nonunanimous jury, with ten jurors voting for conviction and two

concerning novel applications of rights already deemed incorporated," id. at 690, Justice
Ginsburg explained that "[i]n considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a
protection contained in the Bill of Rights, we ask whether the right guaranteed-not each and
every particular application of that right-is fundamental or deeply rooted." Id. Thus, for
example, the Court's acknowledgement in Packinghamv. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017),
a case invalidating a state law prohibiting registered sex offenders from using certain social
media, that the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause applied to the states did not necessitate
the Court to "inquire whether the Free Speech Clause's application specifically to social media
websites was fundamental or deeply rooted." Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 690. The Court also used the
example of Riley v. California,573 U.S. 373 (2014), which, in holding that warrantless searches
of cell phones generally violate the Fourth Amendment, did not separately consider whether the
application of the Fourth Amendment to cell phones was incorporated. See Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at
690-91.
87 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 686-87 (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting McDonald,
561 U.S. at 767). See generally Suja A. Thomas, Response, What Timbs Does Not Say, GEO. WASH.
L. REV. ON THE DOCKET (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.gwlr.org/what-timbs-does-not-say
[https://perma.cc/AB6J-X4R6].
88 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
89 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
90 See Apodaca, 406 U.S. 404; Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
91 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
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jurors voting to acquit.92 Ramos was sentenced to life in prison without
parole.93 Right at the outset of the majority opinion, written by Justice
Gorsuch, the Court did what it failed to do in Apodaca and interrogated
the underlying racist origin and racial impact of nonunanimous juries.
The Court described a Louisiana constitutional convention just before
the turn of the twentieth century, the purpose of which was to advance
white supremacy. 94 Among the measures adopted were mechanismssuch as poll taxes, a literacy test, a property ownership requirement, and
a grandfather clause-all designed to suppress the African American
vote. 95 In addition, in an effort to evade federal scrutiny of its systematic
exclusion of African Americans from jury service, "the convention
delegates sculpted a 'facially race-neutral' rule permitting 10-to-2
verdicts in order 'to ensure that African-American juror service would
be meaningless."'96 The Court also noted that, in Oregon, the only other

state permitting nonunanimous jury verdicts, the rule could be "traced
to the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and efforts to dilute 'the influence of
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities on Oregon juries."'97
With that background established,98 the Court proceeded to
answer the question "whether the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial-as incorporated against the States by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment-requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a
serious offense."99 The Court first explored what is meant by the
language "trial by an impartial jury" in the Sixth Amendment.oo
Explaining that the language must have "meant something,"1to the Court
noted the incongruity of assuming a hollow meaning of the right but
having strict requirements regarding from where the jurors must be
drawn.102 The Court also asserted that the fact that the jury right is
92 Id. at 1393-94.

93 Id. at 1394.
94 Id. (noting that "[a]ccording to one committee chairman, the avowed purpose of that
convention was to 'establish the supremacy of the white race"').
95 See id.
96 Id.
97

Id.

98 Id. ("[N]o one before us contests any of this; courts in both Louisiana and Oregon have
frandy acknowledged that race was a motivating factor in the adoption of their States' respective
nonunanimity rules.").
99 Id. Interestingly, although the Court had long assumed that the Sixth Amendment
contained a unanimity requirement-regardless of whether it was incorporated to apply to the
states-it had never definitively held as such. See id. at 1396-97; id. at 1397 n.22 (collecting cases);
id. at 1399-1400 (casting skepticism on-but not definitively rejecting-Louisiana's argument
that the Court's many statements that the jury right required unanimity were dicta).
100 Id. at 1395.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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found in both Article III of the original Constitution and in the Sixth

Amendment further supported the notion that "[t]he text and structure
of the Constitution clearly suggest that the term 'trial by an impartial
jury' carried with it some meaning about the content and requirements

of a jury trial."103
The Court then explained that unanimity was one of those
requirements of a jury trial-part of what jury trial meant at the time of
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. Relying on history stretching
back to fourteenth-century England, Blackstone's explication of the
common law, and American state practice in the founding era, in which
six states had unanimity provisions in their constitutions, the Court
described a backdrop to the stature of the jury unanimity requirement
when the Sixth Amendment was drafted and ratified.104 The Court also
pointed to the endorsement of the unanimity requirement in postfounding treatises and in more than a dozen opinions of the Supreme
105
Court stretching back to the late nineteenth century.
Having made its case that unanimity is an essential feature of the
Sixth Amendment jury trial right, the Court also reaffirmed that rights
applying to the federal government, if incorporated to apply to the
states, apply in the same manner:
There can be no question either that the Sixth Amendment's
unanimity requirement applies to state and federal criminal trials
equally. This Court has long explained that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial is "fundamental to the American scheme of

justice" and incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This Court has long explained, too, that incorporated
provisions of the Bill of Rights bear the same content when asserted
against States as they do when asserted against the federal
government. So if the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury trial
requires a unanimous verdict to support a conviction in federal
106
court, it requires no less in state court.
The Ramos majority then analyzed and critiqued Apodaca v.
10
Oregon o7 and Johnson v. Louisiana, 8 companion cases in which the
103 Id.; see also U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury."); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.").
104 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395-96.
105 See id. at 1396-97.
106 Id. at 1397 (first citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-50 (1968); and then citing
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964)).
107 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
108 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
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Court first addressed jury unanimity in 1972.109 The Court was severely
divided in the cases and, as the Ramos majority noted, four dissenting
Justices endorsed the incorporation of the unanimity requirement
against the states. 11 On the other hand, the four-Justice plurality
"refrained the question" before the Court as concerning the importance
of unanimity's function in modern society and determined that a costbenefit analysis militated against striking down the Louisiana or Oregon
nonunanimity rules.i The ninth and deciding vote from Justice Powell
permitted him to employ his "dual-track incorporation" theory-still
inconsistent with Court precedent-to decide that the Sixth
Amendment jury right contained a unanimity requirement but that this
feature was not incorporated against the states." 2
After dissecting Apodaca and Johnson, the Ramos Court took on
Louisiana's argument that the drafting history of the Sixth Amendment
evinces a conscious decision to dispense with the common law
requirement of jury unanimity.113 The Court considered Louisiana's
observation that James Madison's original proposed Sixth Amendment
language included unanimity, and the House approved it, but that the
Senate subsequently dropped the unanimity language."4
However, as the Court highlighted, other language-such as the
right of challenge and "other "accustomed requisites"-also was
removed."s According to the Court, the deletion could simply have
meant it was seen as surplusage-too obvious to have to mention.116
Furthermore, if dropping the "unanimity for conviction" language
meant what Louisiana asserts, this would lead to the nonsensical
conclusion that all "accustomed requisites" were scuttled as well.117
The Court then attacked the reasoning-adopted by the fourJustice plurality in Apodaca-that unanimous juries do not provide
sufficient value to warrant inclusion in the jury right, arguing that it
ignores the racial animus behind the rules,118 that the stated desire to

109 See Ramos,

110 Id. at 1397.
111 Id. at 1398.
112 Id.

113 Id. at 1400.
114 Id.

115 Id.
116 Id.

117 Id.
118 Id. at 1401.

140 S. Ct. at 1397-98.
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avoid hung juries is not significant enough,119 and that we should not
subject ancient guarantees to cost-benefit analyses.120
Despite dispatching the arguments in favor of affirming Apodaca,
the Court still had to grapple with the question of whether the doctrine
21
of stare decisis counseled leaving the decision intact.1 The Court
concluded that it is, at best, unclear that Apodaca established clear
precedent by a controlling majority, noting Justice Powell's

endorsement of the unanimity requirement but his rejection of its
incorporation under his discredited dual-track incorporation theory.122
In the final section of its lengthy opinion, the Court noted that even
if Apodaca had precedential effect, there is no support on the current
Court for the position that it was rightly decided.123 Explaining that
"when it revisits a precedent this Court has traditionally considered 'the
quality of the decision's reasoning; its consistency with related
decisions; legal developments since the decision; and reliance on the

decision,"'124 the Court examined the four traditional guideposts for
overturning precedent.
First, the Court asserted that the quality of the reasoning was poor,
and that, indeed, "Apodaca was gravely mistaken."125 The Court noted
that there was no analysis of the historical meaning of the Sixth
Amendment jury right, no consideration of the Court's many

statements requiring unanimity, and no consideration of the racist
origins of the rule.126 The Court then noted the lack of consistency with

related decisions, given that Apodaca "sits uneasily with 120 years of
preceding case law."127 Additionally, the legal developments since
Apodaca was decided-with dual-track incorporation having been
"roundly rejected"128 and the Court repeatedly referring to the
119 Id. The Court also pointed out that hung juries are not necessarily detrimental. Id. ("But
who can say whether any particular hung jury is a waste, rather than an example of a jury doing
exactly what the plurality said it should-deliberating carefully and safeguarding against
overzealous prosecutions?").
120 Id. at 1402 ("When the American people chose to enshrine that right in the Constitution,
they weren't suggesting fruitful topics for future cost-benefit analyses.").
121 See id.

122 See id. at 1402-04 ("[S]tripped from any reasoning, [Apodaca's] judgment alone cannot be
read to repudiate this Court's repeated pre-existing teachings on the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
123 Id. at 1404-05 ("Even if we accepted the premise that Apodaca established a precedent, no
one on the Court today is prepared to say it was rightly decided, and stare decisis isn't supposed
to be the art of methodically ignoring what everyone knows to be true.").
124 Id. at 1405 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019)).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127

Id.

128 Id.
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unanimity requirement-militated in favor of overturning the
decision.129
The last of the four guideposts-the reliance interests on the
decision-received the most attention from the Court, which noted that
neither State was claiming "prospective economic, regulatory, or social
disruption" if the decision were overturned,130 nor were they suggesting
"that nonunanimous verdicts have 'become part of our national
culture."'131 Therefore, the Court concluded, there are only two
potential reliance interests implicated by the overruling of Apodaca.
The first is that it may be necessary to retry many defendants if Apodaca
is overruled, but the Court reminded that "new rules of criminal
procedure[] usually do [impose a cost]."132 The other identified reliance
interest was in finality of final judgments and the concern that such
finality will be undermined by prisoners bringing collateral attacks on
otherwise final convictions.133 However, the Court responded that the
Teague v. Lane decision, which governs retroactivity, is a "demanding"
rule, and in any event, the issue was not before the Court, nor should it

have been at this stage. 134

Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's argument that this issue
was of "little practical importance" because Louisiana "abolished"
nonunanimous verdicts and Oregon was on the verge before certiorari
was granted in Ramos.135 The Court noted that the new Louisiana law is
prospective, and, thus, pre-2019 offenses were still subject to
nonunanimous verdicts.136 Additionally, fourteen states had noted that
they would welcome the ability "to 'experiment' with nonunanimous
juries."137 Furthermore, the Court made clear, those subject to
nonunanimous juries in Louisiana, Oregon, and elsewhere consider this
of great practical importance.138 The Court concluded by asserting that
the reliance interests of states in avoiding one-time need to retry

129 See id. at 1405-06.
130 Id. at 1406.
131 Id. (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
132 See id. (first citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); then citing Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); and then citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)).
133 Id. at 1407.

134 Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently decided that the jury unanimity rule does not
apply retroactively to cases pending on federal collateral review. See Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S.
Ct. 1547 (2021).
135 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1407.
136 Id.
137 Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae State of Utah et al. Supporting Respondent, Ramos, 140
S. Ct. 1390 (No. 18-5924), 2019 WL 4054628, at *1).
138 See id. at 1408.
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defendants cannot outweigh the reliance interests of the American
139
people on the Sixth Amendment guarantee.
II.

HURTADO AND PRAGMATIC PROCEDURAL FEDERALISM

With the decision in Ramos, the project of selective
incorporation-and the aim of total incorporation-is nearly complete.
Notwithstanding the battle between selective incorporation and total
incorporation theories, we have almost arrived at the place that Justice
Black's total incorporation theory would have ordained. With one
exception, every single criminal procedural protection contained in the
140
Bill of Rights has been incorporated to apply to the states. The right

139

Id.

140 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (incorporating the right to jury unanimity); Timbs v. Indiana,
139 S. Ct. 682 (2019) (incorporating the prohibition on excessive fines). The Supreme Court in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, which was decided a decade before Ramos and Timbs, explained
the state of play on incorporation at the time, prior to those decisions. See 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13
(2010) ("In addition to the right to keep and bear arms (and the Sixth Amendment right to a
unanimous jury verdict), the only rights not fully incorporated are (1) the Third Amendment's
protection against quartering of soldiers; (2) the Fifth Amendment's grand jury indictment
requirement; (3) the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and (4) the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on excessive fines. We never have decided whether the Third
Amendment or the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States
through the Due Process Clause. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) (declining to decide whether the excessive-fines protection applies
to the States); see also Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding as a matter of
first impression that the 'Third Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for
application to the states')."); see also id. at 766 n.14 ("There is one exception to this general rule.
The Court has held that although the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires a
unanimous jury verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not require a unanimous jury verdict in
state criminal trials. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); see also Johnson v. Louisiana,
406 U.S. 356 (1972) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not require unanimous jury
verdicts in state criminal trials). But that ruling was the result of an unusual division among the
Justices, not an endorsement of the two-track approach to incorporation. In Apodaca, eight
Justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment applies identically to both the Federal Government
and the States. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, among those
eight, four Justices took the view that the Sixth Amendment does not require unanimous jury
verdicts in either federal or state criminal trials, Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406 (plurality opinion), and
four other Justices took the view that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts in
federal and state criminal trials, id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Johnson, 406 U.S. at 38182 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Powell's concurrence in the judgment broke the tie, and he
concluded that the Sixth Amendment requires juror unanimity in federal, but not state, cases.
Apodaca, therefore, does not undermine the well-established rule that incorporated Bill of Rights
protections apply identically to the States and the Federal Government. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at
395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('In any event, the affirmance must not obscure that the majority
of the Court remains of the view that, as in the case of every specific of the Bill of Rights that
extends to the States, the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, however it is to be construed,
has identical application against both State and Federal Governments' (footnote omitted)).").
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to grand jury indictment is the sole outlier-because of the Court's 1884
decision in Hurtado v. Cahfornia,141which predated the era of selective
incorporation.142 Faced with the question of whether a state could,
consistent with due process, dispense with the grand jury as a means of
initiating a serious criminal prosecution, the Court answered in the

affirmative:
Tried by these principles, we are unable to say that the substitution
for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding
by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate,
certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his
part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the
witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law.143
The ultimate consequence of Hurtadowas a grand jury with much
weaker prestige and standing in the American legal culture than before
the decision. Even on the federal level, where the grand jury is secured
by the explicit constitutional command of the Fifth Amendment, there
were attempts to abolish the grand jury.144 And many states, free in the
aftermath of Hurtado to sidestep the grand jury, permitted criminal
cases to begin by prosecutor's information rather than grand jury
indictment.145 Today, as Justice Alito noted in his Ramos dissent,
"Hurtadoremains good law and is critically important to the 28 States
that allow a defendant to be prosecuted for a felony without a grand jury
indictment."146

141 110 U.S. 516 (1884); see also Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1435 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Even now,
our cases do not hold that every provision of the Bill of Rights applies in the same way to the
Federal Government and the States. A notable exception is the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, a provision that, like the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, reflects the importance
that the founding generation attached to juries as safeguards against oppression.").
142 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 765 n.13 ("Our governing decisions regarding the Grand Jury
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement long
predate the era of selective incorporation."); see also id. at 784 n.30 ("[C]ases that predate the era
of selective incorporation held that the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement do not apply to the States.").
143 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538.
144 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of
the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 339, 346 (2010) [hereinafter Fairfax,
Grand Jury Innovation]; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury
Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398, 428-30 (2006) [hereinafter Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage].
145 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 784 n.30 ("As a result of Hurtado, most States do not
require a grand jury indictment in all felony cases, and many have no grand juries." (citing U.S.
DEPT.

OF JUST.,

STATE

COURT

ORGANIZATION

2004,

at

213,

215-17,

tbl.38

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQA7-GENE])).
146 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1435 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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The Nonincorporationof the GrandJury Clause

The State of California, in its 1879 constitution, made grand jury
indictment optional for serious offenses.147 Under the state constitution
and the relevant state procedural law, a magistrate could hold over a
defendant for prosecution if sworn testimony, reduced to writing,
persuaded the magistrate that there was "sufficient cause" that the crime
had been committed by the defendant.148 During the magistrate's

examination, the accused was permitted to be present and defendant's

49
counsel could cross-examine the witnesses.1 The law provided further
that when a magistrate had examined the evidence and committed the
defendant for further proceedings, the prosecutor was bound to file an
information formally charging the defendant with the offense.150

Although the information was required to "be in the name of the people
of the state of California, and subscribed by the district attorney, and
shall be in form like an indictment,"151 the criminal prosecution

ultimately could be initiated without intervention of, or review by, the
grand jury.15 2
Joseph Hurtado was charged by information with first-degree
murder in February 1882.153 Although the aforementioned magistrate
procedure was followed prior to the filing of the information, there had
been no grand jury review of the charges.154 Hurtado pleaded not guilty
to the murder charge, and he was convicted at trial and sentenced to

death.155 He appealed on the ground that the California procedure
permitting the serious criminal charge to be lodged pursuant to a

prosecutor's information rather than a grand jury indictment
contravened the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.1 56 The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
relying on its recent precedent concluding that, whether or not
"proceeding by indictment secures to the accused any superior rights

147 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 517 ("Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment,
shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law.")
(quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (1879)).
148 Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (west 1872)).
149

See id.

150 See id. at 517-18 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE

151 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 809).
152 See id.
153 Id. at 518.
154

Id.

155 Id.
156 Id. at 518-19.

§ 809).
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and privileges,"157 the state procedure permitting prosecution by
information was consistent with due process.158 The California Supreme
Court also had relied upon a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court case
addressing the question:
[The Fourteenth Amendment's] design was not to confine the states
to a particular mode of procedure in judicial proceedings, and
prohibit them from prosecuting for felonies by information instead
of by indictment, if they chose to abolish the grand jury system. And
the words "due process of law" in the amendment do not mean and
have not the effect to limit the powers of state governments to
prosecutions for crime by indictment; but these words do mean law
in its regular course of administration, according to prescribed
forms, and in accordance with the general rules for the protection of
individual rights. Administration and remedial proceedings must
change, from time to time, with the advancement of legal science and
the progress of society; and, if the people of the state find it wise and
expedient to abolish the grand jury and prosecute all crimes by
information, there is nothing in our state constitution and nothing
in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States
which prevents them from doing so. 159
1.

The Hurtado Majority and Procedural Flexibility

On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Hurtado argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment did, indeed, require-specificallygrand jury indictment.160 The term "due process of law," Hurtado
maintained, encompasses the procedures and institutions-traced back
to the Magna Carta and eventually integrated into the Constitution of
the United States-that protect fundamental rights and liberties.161 The
grand jury, under this view, was one such institution, and, therefore,
was a requisite of due process made mandatory by the Fourteenth
Amendment and could not be dispensed with by the States. 162 Hurtado's
position on the essential nature of the grand jury found support from a

157 Id. at 520 (quoting Kalloch v. Super. Ct. of S.F., 56 Cal. 229, 241 (1880)).
158 Id.
159 Id. at 520-21 (quoting Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 149 (1872)).
160 Id. at 521.
161 Id.

162 See id. (noting petitioner's argument "that one of these institutions is that of the grand
jury, an indictment or presentment by which against the accused in cases of alleged felonies is an
essential part of due process of law, in order that he may not be harassed and destroyed by
prosecutions founded only upon private malice or popular fury").
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prominent jurist, Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court, who wrote in the case of Jones v. Robbins:
The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public
accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a
public trial, before a probable cause is established by the presentment
and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly
regarded as one of the securities to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the
ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.163
Chief Justice Shaw went on to rely upon Lord Coke, Blackstone,
and others to support the conclusion that grand jury indictment was an

64
essential ingredient of due process.1 The Hurtado Court, however,

rejected this construction urged by the petitioner. The Court expressed
skepticism that the authorities relied upon by Chief Justice Shaw
militated in favor of Hurtado's view of the grand jury right and pointed

to other authorities supporting the notion that due process does not
specifically require the right to grand jury indictment.165
Perhaps the most compelling feature of the Hurtado majority can
be found in its explanation that a fixed and static notion of what specific

procedures are necessary to supply due process would serve as an
obstacle to progress and innovation:166
But to hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to
render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp
upon our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws
of the Medes and Persians.
This would be all the more singular and surprising, in this quick
and active age, when we consider that, owing to the progressive
development of legal ideas and institutions in England, the words of
Magna Charta stood for very different things at the time of the
separation of the American colonies from what they represented
originally.167
The Court noted that the Magna Carta did not refer to juries as
they were known by the nineteenth century, but rather to
163 Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 344 (1857) (holding that giving a magistrate authority to
try a felony offense without grand jury intervention violated the State's Declaration of Rights).
164 See id. at 346-47.
165 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 522-38.
166 See id. at 527-28 ("The principles, then, upon which the process is based, are to determine
whether it is 'due process' or not, and not any considerations of mere form. Administrative and
remedial process may be changed from time to time, but only with due regard to the landmarks
established for the protection of the citizen." (citation omitted)).
167 Id. at 529.
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"constitutional judges in the court of exchequer."168 Further, the grand
jury, as the Court explained, at its origins had few of the features
associated with it by the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the twelfth-century grand jury was a purely
accusatory body, and its accusation was tantamount to conviction and

was a prerequisite to a trial by ordeal and possible mutilation and
exile.169 The Court concluded that
[w]hen we add to this that the primitive grand jury heard no
witnesses in support of the truth of the charges to be preferred, but
presented upon their own knowledge, or indicted upon common
fame and general suspicion, we shall be ready to acknowledge that it
is better not to go too far back into antiquity for the best securities
for our "ancient liberties."170
The Court also employed the canon of construction that words and
terms are not meant to be superfluous, absent evidence to the
contrary.171 Under this approach, the fact that the Fifth Amendment's
Grand Jury Clause is immediately followed by the Due Process Clause 172
is strong evidence that due process was not meant to include the right
to grand jury indictment.173 The Court found further support in the fact
that the Fourteenth Amendment used the term "due process" and did
not include explicit reference to the grand jury right.174 The Court
concluded that the use of the term "due process" in the Fourteenth
Amendment "was used in the same sense and with no greater extent"
than in the Fifth Amendment,175 "and that if in the adoption of that
amendment it had been part of its purpose to perpetuate the institution
of the grand jury in all the states, it would have embodied, as did the
fifth amendment, express declarations to that effect."176
The Court noted that informations were used at common law for
misdemeanors other than treason, and that California's information
168 Id.
169

Id.

170 Id. at 530.
171 Id. at 534-35.
172 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.").
173 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534 ("According to a recognized canon of interpretation,
especially applicable to formal and solemn instruments of constitutional law, we are forbidden
to assume, without clear reason to the contrary, that any part of this most important amendment
is superfluous. The natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, 'due
process of law' was not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure
of a grand jury in any case.").
174 See id. at 534-35.
175 Id. at 535.
176 Id.
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procedure "carefully considers and guards the substantial interest of the
prisoner,"177 alluding to the right of cross-examination of witnesses, the
17
right to counsel, and the right of the defendant to be present. 8 The
Court also minimized the importance of the information procedure,
stating that "[i]t is merely a preliminary proceeding, and can result in
no final judgment, except as the consequence of a regular judicial trial,
conducted precisely as in cases of indictments."179
In conclusion, the Court held as consistent with due process of law
"the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the

proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a

magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the
right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of
the witnesses produced for the prosecution."180
2.

Harlan's Dissent and Rights Primacy

Justice Harlan was no stranger to powerful dissents.181 Although
his most famous and consequential dissent would be drafted a dozen
years later,82 Harlan's dissent in Hurtado is a tour de force in its own

right. In a lengthy and scholarly dissenting opinion, Harlan rejected the
majority's view "thatthe state may, consistently, with due process of law
require a person to answer for a capital offense, except upon the
Id. at 538.
See id.
179 Id. On this point that the process begun by information provided the same protections as
those provided by grand jury indictment, the Court quoted Blackstone's description of the
information procedure:
And as to those offenses in which informations were allowed as well as indictments, so
long as they were confined to this high and respectable jurisdiction, and were carried
on in a legal and regular course in his majesty's court of king's bench, the subject had
no reason to complain. The same notice was given, the same process was issued, the
same pleas were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judgment was given
by the same judges, as if the prosecution had originally been by indictment.
177
178

Id. (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *310).
180 Id.
181 See, e.g., PETER S. CANELLOS, THE GREAT DISSENTER: THE STORY OF JOHN MARSHALL

HARLAN, AMERICA'S JUDICIAL HERO (2021). However, it should be noted that while Harlan is
often celebrated for his support of a "color-blind" constitutionalism, scholars have examined his
troubling views on racial equality, particularly as related to Chinese immigrants. See, e.g., Eric
Schepard, The Great Dissenter's Greatest Dissents: The First Justice Harlan, the "Color-Blind"
Constitution and the Meaning of His Dissents in the Insular Cases for the War on Terror, 48 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 119 (2006); Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases,
82 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1996); Earl M. Maltz, Only Partially Color-Blind: John Marshall Harlan's
View of Race and the Constitution, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 973 (1996).
182 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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presentment or indictment of a grand jury."183 He first emphasized that
the concept of "due process of law" is ancient, and "antedates the
establishment of our institutions."184 Harlan traced the phrase through
the various enumerations of rights in England, in the American
colonies, in the state constitutions, and ultimately into both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.185
Harlan stressed that due process has the same meaning whether
referencing constraints on the federal government or state
governments:
"Due process of law," within the meaning of the national
constitution, does not import one thing with reference to the powers
of the states and another with reference to the powers of the general
government. If particular proceedings, conducted under the
authority of the general government, and involving life, are
prohibited because not constituting that due process of law required
by the fifth amendment of the constitution of the United States,
similar proceedings, conducted under the authority of a state, must
be deemed illegal, as not being due process of law within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. The words "due process of law," in
the latter amendment, must receive the same interpretation they had
at the common law from which they were derived, and which was
given to them at the formation of the general government. 186
As to what is the unitary meaning of due process for the restraint
of both federal and state power, Harlan argued that the inquiry begins
with the Constitution itself to determine whether the proposed process
contravenes it.187 In the absence of such a conflict, Harlan explained,
we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding
existing in the common and statute law of England before the
emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
on by them after the settlement of this country. 188
Harlan acknowledged the existence of English precedents on both
sides of the question of whether prosecution by information was
sufficient to satisfy due process, 189 but emphasized that, given that
183 Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
184 Id.
185 See id. at 539-41.
186 Id. at 541.

187 See id. at 542 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-77
(1855)).
188 Id. Harlan also cited a number of authorities for the proposition that "due process of law"
was equivalent to "law of the land" in Magna Carta. See id. at 543 (collecting authorities).
189 See id. at 543.
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petitioner Hurtado had been charged with capital murder, the query is
"whether, according to the settled usages and modes of proceeding to

which, this court has said, reference must be had, an information for a
capital offense was, prior to the adoption of our constitution, regarded
as due process of law."190 For that proposition, Harlan cited several

authorities,191 including Blackstone, who asserted:
[S]o tender is the law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no
man can be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital offense,
unless by a unanimous voice of twenty-four of his equals and
neighbors; that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the first
place, assenting to the accusation, and afterwards by the whole petit
jury of twelve more finding him guilty upon his trial.192
This and similar statements from Erskine, Hawkins, Bacon, and
others were, for Justice Harlan, clear and convincing evidence "that,
according to the settled usages and modes of proceeding existing under
the common and statute law of England at the settlement of this
country, information in capital cases was not consistent with the 'law of
the land' or with due process of law."193 Furthermore, Harlan

maintained, this was the understanding of those in the founding
generation.194
Then, taking the majority to task for its conclusion that the right
to jury indictment is not a requisite of due process in a capital case,
Harlan noted that the Framers' inclusion of the grand jury right in

explicit terms in the Fifth Amendment demonstrated that the
protection "was essential to protection against accusation and
unfounded prosecution, and therefore was a fundamental principle in
liberty and justice."195 Harlan also highlighted the complete absence of
authority-in England or in America-supporting the use of the

information in a capital case.
In

addition,

Harlan

questioned

the

majority's

superfluity

argument that the Framers would not have included the grand jury right
in the Fifth Amendment, which also contains the Due Process Clause,
if they believed that the grand jury protection was, in fact, a requisite of
due process. 19 6 Thus, the majority's reasoning goes, the Fourteenth

Amendment's Due Process Clause also cannot be thought to
190 Id. (emphasis added).

191 Seeid. at 543-45 (collecting authorities).
192 Id. at 544 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *306).

193
194
upon
195
196

Id. at 545.
Id. ("Such was the understanding of the patriotic men who established free institutions
this continent.").
Id. at 546.
See id. at 547-48.
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contemplate the grand jury right.197 Harlan noted that, if one were to
take that argument to its logical conclusion, it would lead to absurd
results:
If the presence in the fifth amendment of a specific provision for
grand juries in capital cases, along-side the provision for due process
of law in proceedings involving life, liberty, or property, is held to
prove that "due process of law" did not, in the judgment of the
framers of the constitution, necessarily require a grand jury in capital
cases, inexorable logic would require it to be likewise held that the
right not to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb, for the same
offense, nor compelled in a criminal case to testify against one's
self-rights and immunities also specifically recognized in the fifth
amendment-were not protected by that due process of law required
by the settled usages and proceedings existing under the common
and statute law of England at the settlement of this country. More
than that, other amendments of the constitution proposed at the
same time expressly recognize the right of persons to just
compensation for private property taken for public use; their right,
when accused of crime, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them, and to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime was
committed; to be confronted with the witnesses against them; and to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor. Will
it be claimed that none of these rights were secured by the "law of
the land" or "due process of law," as declared and established at the
foundation of our government? Are they to be excluded from the
enumeration of the fundamental principles of liberty and justice,
and, therefore, not embraced by "due process of law?"198

197 See id. at 547.
198 Id. at 547-48. Harlan also suggested that the fact that the grand jury and other due process
rights were enumerated was a function of the Framers' desire to ensure that Congress would not
infringe them, with the "catch-all" Due Process Clause serving as added protection for
unenumerated due process rights. As Harlan explained:

It seems to me that too much stress is put upon the fact that the framers of the
constitution made express provision for the security of those rights which at common
law were protected by the requirement of due process of law, and, in addition, declared,
generally, that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." The rights, for the security of which these express provisions were
made, were of a character so essential to the safety of the people that it was deemed
wise to avoid the possibility that congress, in regulating the processes of law, would
impair or destroy them. Hence, their specific enumeration in the earlier amendments
of the constitution, in connection with the general requirement of due process of law,
the latter itself being broad enough to cover every right of life, liberty, or property
secured by the settled usages and modes of proceedings existing under the common
and statute law of England at the time our government was founded.
Id. at 550.
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Harlan closed the loop by pointing out that under the majority's

approach, a state would not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause if it "dispens[ed] with petit juries in criminal cases,

and permitt[ed] a person charged with a crime involving life to be tried
before a single judge, or even a justice of the peace, upon a rule to show
cause why he should not be hanged."199 The grand jury, Harlan asserted,
200
was no less important a protection than was the petit jury, and,

therefore, the majority's reasoning should be thought equally unsound
in the context of the grand jury right as it is would be in the petit jury
right.201

The dissent also dismissed the majority's implication that a shift
from grand jury indictment to prosecution by information, represented
procedural innovation or progress contemplated by a flexible
202
understanding of due process, highlighting the importance of the lay
grand jury in providing a barrier between the defendant and the

burdens of trial.203 Harlan observed that, in the California system,
because the prosecutor must act on the magistrate's decision to approve
the charges, "nothing stands between the citizen and prosecution for his

life except the judgment of a justice of the peace."204 The fact that the
grand jury is composed not of judges or prosecutors, but of lay
individuals not beholden to the government, was also cited by Harlan
205 In addition,
as a distinctive feature of the grand jury protection.
Harlan emphasized that the grand jury's secrecy, which insulates it from
interference and public sentiment, is a feature that enhances its ability
2 06
Harlan
to protect members of marginalized or unpopular groups.

concluded by recognizing that, at the time of the Fourteenth

199 Id. at 548.
200 See id. at 549 ("I submit, however, with confidence, there is no foundation for the opinion
that, under Magna Charta or at common law, the right to a trial by jury in a capital case was
deemed of any greater value to the safety and security of the people than was the right not to
answer, in a capital case, upon information filed by an officer of the government, without
previous inquiry by a grand jury. While the former guards the citizen against improper
conviction, the latter secures him against unfounded accusation.").
201

See id.

202 See id. at 553 ("It is difficult, however, to perceive anything in the system of prosecuting
human beings for their lives, by information, which suggests that the state which adopts it has
entered upon an era of progress and improvement in the law of criminal procedure.").
203 See id. at 551-52.
204 Id. at 554.
205

Id.

206 See id. at 554-55 ("In the secrecy of the investigations by grand juries, the weak and
helpless-proscribed, perhaps, because of their race, or pursued by an unreasoning public
clamor-have found, and will continue to find, security against official oppression, the cruelty of
mobs, the machinations of falsehood, and the malevolence of private persons who would use the
machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their personal enemies.").
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Amendment, all thirty-seven states either explicitly or implicitly
prohibited prosecution by information in capital cases. 207
Harlan's scholarly dissenting opinion concluded with a passage
summarizing the majority's approach:
So that the court, in this case, while conceding that the requirement
of due process of law protects the fundamental principles of liberty
and justice, adjudges, in effect, that an immunity or right, recognized
at the common law to be essential to personal security, jealously
guarded by our national constitution against violation by any
tribunal or body exercising authority under the general government,
and expressly or impliedly recognized, when the fourteenth
amendment was adopted, in the bill of rights or constitution of every
state in the Union, is yet not a fundamental principle in governments
established, as those of the states of the Union are, to secure to the
citizen liberty and justice, and therefore is not involved in due
process of law as required by that amendment in proceedings
conducted under the sanction of a state. 208
As such, Harlan declared, his "sense of duty constrains [him] to
dissent from this interpretation of the supreme law of the land."209
B.

Taking Inventory of Hurtado, Due Process, and the Non-

Essentialism of the Grand Jury Right
1.

Predating the Era of Selective Incorporation

There are a number of observations to be made about the Hurtado
decision. First, the case presented a matter of first impression for the
Supreme Court-whether the explicit criminal procedural constraints
on the federal government found in the Bill of Rights were incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to constrain
the States. Thus, Hurtado stood for much more than whether the grand
jury right was necessary to due process; it was a harbinger of the judicial
philosophy that would pervade the Court's decisions on the
incorporation of other protections in the Bill of Rights.
However, the Hurtado decision was not the first of the selective

incorporation decisions. The better view is that Hurtado was an

207 See id. at 557 ("It may be safely affirmed that, when that amendment was adopted, a
criminal prosecution, by information, for a crime involving life, was not permitted in any one of
the states composing the Union.").
208 Id. at 557-58.
209 Id. at 558.
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0
antecedent of the era of selective incorporation,21 and it did not reflect

the application of the various "touchstones" that eventually developed
in the Court's incorporation jurisprudence.211 Although the Court

eventually would move in fits and starts toward selectively
212
incorporating nearly all of those rights in the criminal context, it has
remained faithful to Hurtado's estimation of the necessity-or lack
213
thereof-of grand jury indictment to the provision of due process.

2.

Weighing the Value of Procedural Mechanisms for Protection of

Defendants
The Court, in Hurtado, credited as consistent with due process a
procedure by which a magistrate initiates criminal charges only after
considering sworn testimony reduced to writing and subject to crossexamination by defendant's counsel with the defendant given a right to
be present. Some might find this procedure just as protective, if not
more protective, of the defendant's rights as the grand jury. The grand
jury operates under the direction of the prosecutor, rather than under
214
Hurtado's "neutral" magistrate. Unlike the procedure approved in
Hurtado, the defendant has no right nor ability to cross-examine
witnesses before the grand jury, nor is defense counsel even present. Of

course, the grand jury traditionally does not permit the defendant to be
present for its secret proceedings, whereas the Hurtado procedure is

presumably done in open court.
One might be tempted to conclude that the Hurtado procedure, in

addition to being more efficient and less costly from the State's
perspective, is a superior protection for the defendant. Certainly, the
prerogative of present counsel, oversight of a magistrate rather than a

210 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) ("Our governing
decisions regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh
Amendment's civil jury requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation.").
211 See supra Section I.B; infra Part III.
212 See supra Section I.A.
213 See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 283-84 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, a State may surely adopt as its own a procedure which was the
established method for prosecuting crime in nearly half the States which ratified that
amendment. And so, it may abolish the grand jury, or it may reduce the size of the grand jury,
and even to a single member. A State has great leeway in devising its judicial instruments for
probing into conduct as a basis for charging the commission of crime. It may, at the same time,
surround such preliminary inquiry with safeguards, not only that crime may be detected and
criminals punished, but also that charges may be sifted in secret so as not to injure or embarrass
the innocent.").
214 Cf David E. Steinberg, Zealous Officers and Neutral Magistrates: The Rhetoric of the Fourth
Amendment, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1019 (2010).
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prosecutor, cross-examination, and the presence of the defendant are
features the grand jury lacks. However, the grand jury, as discussed
below,215 is composed of lay individuals, not government officials.216
These grand jurors, who are meant to represent a cross-section of the
community, are positioned to inject community wisdom and common
sense into the determination of the worthiness of a criminal
prosecution.217 This nature of the grand jury has historically led it to
sometimes turn back prosecutions even when there is technically
sufficient evidence to support proceeding to trial. These features
associated with the unique role of the grand jury are lost in a
prosecution-by-information procedure.218
If the prosecution-by-information procedure is not superior to the
grand jury, then the justification for straying from the established
mechanism is weakened.219 This is not to suggest that there is no space
between the threshold for due process and the protections offered by
the grand jury. Surely, after Hurtado, a procedural mechanism that falls
short of the grand jury's protection, but exceeded the minimum
required for due process, would be deemed acceptable under the
Fourteenth Amendment.22o It is a matter for reasonable debate whether
the grand jury or the Hurtado procedure is more protective of the
defendant's rights and more closely aligned with due process of law.
However, it is not entirely clear that the prosecution-byinformation process approved as a substitute for the grand jury in

&

215 See infra Section III.B.
216 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554-55 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
217 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional Design, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 703, 745 (2008).
218 Nor is the potential value added by the grand jury limited to the defendant. The grand
jury's common law and statutory power to compel testimony and evidence make it a potent tool
of the government in the exercise of its investigative prerogative. See, e.g., Thaddeus Hoffmeister,
The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting the Grand Jury's Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1172 (2008). The grand jury also has the ability to seek to ferret out illegal
conduct on its own, without the direction of a prosecutor. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
59-66 (1906); Renee B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333
(1994); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1169, 1193-94 (1995).
219 Cf Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). There is evidence that the grand jury
is thought to be a superior protection than the prosecution by information subject to a
subsequent preliminary hearing with counsel and defendant present, a neutral judicial officer
presiding, and the right to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
5.1(a)(2) (providing that a grand jury indictment obviates the need for a preliminary hearing);
see also Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2014).
220 See Kalloch v. Super. Ct. of S.F., 56 Cal. 229, 241 (1880) ("It may be questionable whether
the proceeding by indictment secures to the accused any superior rights and privileges; but
certainly a prosecution by information takes from him no immunity or protection to which he is
entitled under the law."); see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 520 (citing Kalloch, 56 Cal. at 241).
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Hurtado has, in fact, been required by the Court in the 140 years

222
since.2 21 The Court, in a 1913 case, Lem Woon v. United States, held
that a preliminary hearing is not required when a serious crime is

prosecuted by information.223 As such, a prosecutor could, consistent
with due process, initiate a prosecution for a serious offense without
any judicial or grand jury review whether there is sufficient cause for
the prosecution.2 24
3.

Death Is Different

Another notable feature of Hurtado is that it dealt with a capital
case. The significance of the fact that the crime at issue was first-degree
murder cannot be overstated. Death is different.225 For purposes of
charging, the universe can be divided into four categories: (1) petty

offenses

and infractions, which sometimes

have no prosecutor

involvement and rarely feature judicial review of the charges prior to

adjudication; (2) misdemeanors, which generally may be charged by
information with or without subsequent judicial review of the charges
prior to adjudication; (3) noncapital felonies, which must be charged by
grand jury indictment (which can be waived) in the federal system

under the Fifth Amendment, and, as a matter of state law, in a little

221 It was not simply that grand jury indictment was not required for the initiation of a
prosecution to comport with due process. Instead, it was that a grand jury could be substituted
with: (1) a robust preliminary hearing; (2) where the defendant is represented by counsel; (3)
who could challenge the government's evidence; (4) before a judicial officer; (5) who certified
that the government has established probable cause. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538 ("[W]e are
unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the
proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the
probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the crossexamination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law.").
222 229 U.S. 586 (1913).
223 Id. at 590.
224 But see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 292 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In Hurtado
v. California, we decided that the Due Process Clause does not compel the States to proceed by
way of grand jury indictment when they initiate a prosecution. In reaching that conclusion,
however, we noted that the substance of the federal guarantee was preserved by California's
requirement that a magistrate certify 'to the probable guilt of the defendant.' In accord with
Hurtado, I would hold that Illinois may dispense with the grand jury procedure only if the
substance of the probable-cause requirement remains adequately protected." (internal citations
omitted)).
225 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) ("[Dleath is different in kind from any
other punishment imposed under our system of criminal justice."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1)(A) ("An offense (other than
criminal contempt) must be prosecuted by an indictment if it is punishable . . . by death.").
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fewer than half of the states; 226 and (4) capital crimes, which must be
prosecuted by grand jury (and cannot be waived) in the federal system
under the Fifth Amendment, and, as a matter of state law, in those states
both requiring grand jury indictment and having capital punishment.
227

The fact that the Hurtado Court permitted prosecution by
information after magistrate commitment is remarkable. It essentially
relegated capital offenses to the same tier as misdemeanors for the
purpose of the required process due to a defendant before being put to
trial. Had the case involved a noncapital felony offense, there might
have been room in subsequent cases to argue that due process required
grand jury indictment when a defendant's life is at stake. However,
Hurtado'sblessing of the magistrate approval and information process

used in that capital case helped seal the fate of grand jury incorporation
in the Court's jurisprudence going forward.
C.

Reading Hurtado as "PragmaticProceduralFederalism"

Perhaps the most significant takeaway from Hurtadois that it can
be read as an example of "pragmatic procedural federalism."228 Under
this conception, the Court endorsed the view that states could develop
adjudicatory criminal procedures consistent with due process even
when those procedures departed from established-or even ancientprocedures explicitly secured by the Federal Constitution. Importantly,
Hurtadodoes not stand for the proposition that any form of initiation
of criminal prosecution passes constitutional muster. 229 Rather, the
Court said that the command of the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury
Clause is not binding on the States, and that states need not provide for
grand jury indictment in even a capital case, as long as the substitute
procedure is adequate.
In Hurtado, the Court emphasized this procedural flexibility:

226 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces."); BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, at §§ 8:2, 8:3.
227 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a)(1); BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, §§ 8:1, 8:3.
228 This term derives from "pragmatic federalism, a term that has been used as part of a
"taxonomic scheme for connecting federalism more directly with democracy." Robert Justin
Lipkin, Federalism as Balance, 79 TUL. L. REV. 93, 161-62 (2004). The term "pragmatic
federalism" has been employed in the literature on, inter alia, presidential review prerogatives,
see, e.g., John O. McGinnis, PresidentialReview as ConstitutionalRestoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 901,
931 & n.214 (2001), and environmental law. See, e.g., Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and
Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39 COLUM. J. ENV'T L. 390 (2014).
229 See Albright, 510 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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It is more consonant to the true philosophy of our historical legal
institutions to say that the spirit of personal liberty and individual
right, which they embodied, was preserved and developed by a
progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances and
situations of the forms and processes found fit to give, from time to
time, new expression and greater effect to modern ideas of selfgovernment. This flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation
is the peculiar boast and excellence of the common law.230

The Court's adherence to the notion that states should be free to
experiment with procedures that fit evolving needs is quite familiar
today.231 Courts have highlighted the fact that our system of federalism

provides a "laboratory" of sorts for testing different procedural
methods, assuming, of course, they comport with fundamentals of due
process. 232 The genesis of this approach can fairly be traced to
Hurtado,233which led to the decision in Maxwell v. Dow,234 in which the
Court emphasized state procedural flexibility and noted that the right
230 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884). Indeed, this was a central theme of the
majority's assertion that the conception of due process is not limited to the procedural
mechanisms in use at the time of Magna Carta:
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right
and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and as
it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have been
exhausted. On the contrary, we should expect that the new and various experiences of
our own situation and system will mould and shape it into new and not less useful
forms.
531. In his Hurtado dissent, Justice Harlan acknowledged the majority's embrace of
at
Id.
flexibility but disagreed that dispensing with the grand jury represented progress. See id. at 553
("It is difficult, however, to perceive anything in the system of prosecuting human beings for
their lives, by information, which suggests that the state which adopts it has entered upon an era
of progress and improvement in the law of criminal procedure.").
231 See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991).
232

See id.

233 As Justice Rutledge wrote in In re Oliver, a 1948 case involving the Michigan "one-man"
grand jury:
The case demonstrates how far this Court departed from our constitutional plan when,
after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, it permitted selective departure by the
states from the scheme of ordered personal liberty established by the Bill of Rights. In
the guise of permitting the states to experiment with improving the administration of
justice, the Court left them free to substitute, "in spite of the absolutism of continental
governments," their "ideas and processes of civil justice" in place of the time-tried
"principles and institutions of the common law" perpetuated for us in the Bill of
Rights. Only by an exercise of this freedom has Michigan been enabled to adopt and
apply her scheme as was done in this case. It is the immediate offspring of Hurtado v.
California, and later like cases.
333 U.S. 257, 280 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
234

176 U.S. 581 (1900).
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to jury trial, like the grand jury right, was not compelled by the
Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, the States could alter the
number of jurors.235 Likewise, in Twining v. New Jersey,236 the Court
applied a similar rationale in holding that the Fifth Amendment did not
constrain states from denying a defendant the privilege against selfincrimination.237 In the 1994 case of Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,238 the
Court observed Hurtado's legacy in this regard:
Of course, not all deviations from established procedures result in
constitutional infirmity. As the Court noted in Hurtado, to hold all
procedural change unconstitutional "would be to deny every quality
of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of progress or
improvement." A review of the cases, however, suggests that the case
before us is unlike those in which abrogations of common-law
procedures have been upheld. In Hurtado,for example, examination
by a neutral magistrate provided criminal defendants with nearly the
same protection as the abrogated common-law grand jury
procedure.239
Although this procedural flexibility norm is reflected throughout
the Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, it has not gone
unchallenged. Certain Justices have expressed grave skepticism that
states should be permitted to experiment with procedures at the
expense of protections enshrined in the Bill of Rights.240 As Justice
Rutledge explained in his concurrence in In re Oliver:
The states have survived with the nation through great vicissitudes,
for the greater part of our history, without wide departures or
numerous ones from the plan of the Bill of Rights. They accepted
that plan for the nation when they ratified those amendments. They
accepted it for themselves, in my opinion, when they ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment. It was good enough for our fathers. I think
it should be good enough for this Court and for the states.

235 See id. at 604-05 (reaffirming that "the state has full control over the procedure in its
courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must
not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the
Federal Constitution"); id. at 602-03 ("[T]he right to be exempt from prosecution for an
infamous crime, except upon a presentment by a grand jury, is of the same nature as the right to
a trial by a petit jury of the number fixed by the common law. If the state have the power to
abolish the grand jury and the consequent proceeding by indictment, the same course of
reasoning which establishes that right will and does establish the right to alter the number of the
petit jury from that provided by the common law.").
236 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
237 See id. at 111-14.
238 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
239 Id. at 430-31 (internal citations omitted).
240 See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Room enough there is beyond the specific limitations of the Bill of
Rights for the states to experiment toward improving the
administration of justice. Within those limitations there should be
no laboratory excursions, unless or until the people have authorized
them by the constitutionally provided method. This is no time to
experiment with established liberties. That process carries the
dangers of dilution and denial with the chances of enforcing and
241
strengthening.

And, of course, it is significant that in all of the instances of the
Court's adherence to the notion that states should be given the
flexibility to experiment with other procedural forms, the Court
eventually reversed course and subsequently incorporated the right.242
Thus, the Court, in Hurtado, showed its willingness to abrogate an
ancient common law procedural protection. However, the grand juryunlike the protection against double jeopardy or the right of notice or

confrontation-is also itself an institution. It is an entity unto itself, as
well as a vehicle for delivering a due process protection. This nuance is

critical to fully understanding the Hurtado decision. Hurtado did not
hold that a criminal defendant is entitled to no process animating the
initiation of charges. Rather, the case stands for the proposition that the
grand jury is not the exclusive procedural mechanism equipped to

provide such process.
III.

APPLYING THE MODERN INCORPORATION TOUCHSTONES TO THE
GRAND JURY RIGHT

3
As discussed above, the Supreme Court, in Ramos v. Louisiana,24
recently incorporated one of the last remaining unincorporated
criminal procedural protections-the right to jury unanimity-to apply
to the States. In doing so, the Court rejected Justice Powell's dual-track

incorporation approach in Apodaca that, due to the 4-4 split on the

Court in that case, permitted nonunanimous juries to remain in state
criminal cases, contrary to the Sixth Amendment. Justice Alito, in his
dissenting opinion in Ramos, made the following observation:
In Hurtado v. California, the Court held that the Grand Jury Clause
does not bind the States and that they may substitute preliminary
hearings at which the decision to allow a prosecution to go forward
is made by a judge rather than a defendant's peers. That decision was
241 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 280-82 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted).
242 See supra Section I.A.
243 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
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based on reasoning that is not easy to distinguish from Justice
Powell's in Apodaca. Hurtado remains good law and is critically
important to the 28 States that allow a defendant to be prosecuted
for a felony without a grand jury indictment. If we took the same
approach to the Hurtado question that the majority takes in this case,

the holding in that case could be called into question. 244

Justice Alito's claim-that modern incorporation doctrine would
call into question the Supreme Court's nonincorporation of the Fifth
Amendment's right to grand jury indictment-is one worth
interrogating, not only as a matter of constitutional logic, but also of
normative policy.245
The Court's 1884 ruling in Hurtado is not an insurmountable
obstacle to reconsideration of the incorporation of the Grand Jury
Clause. One need not look further than Ramos for an example of the
Court reversing course on an earlier decision that a Bill of Rights
protection does not bind the States. However, the Ramos decision is but
the latest in a line of Supreme Court cases incorporating rights
previously deemed by the Court not to apply to the States.246 In addition,
as with the original decision not to apply the Sixth Amendment right to

jury trial to the States, the 1884 decision in Hurtado not to incorporate
the right to grand jury indictment "long predate [s] the era of selective
incorporation."247 Thus, it is instructive to explore the case for
incorporation of the grand jury right, under the incorporation
touchstones employed in the modern era for determining whether a

244 Id. at 1435 (Alito, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

245 Professor Suja Thomas, a leading jury and incorporation theorist, made an insightful
argument-prior to Ramos-that the Court's theories of what she terms "nonincorporation" do
not justify the failure to incorporate of the then-remaining criminal and noncriminal rights in
the Bill of Rights, including the civil jury, criminal jury unanimity, and the grand jury right. See
Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 159, 180-83 (2012); see also id. at 185-89 (discussing the grand jury right).
246 In Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900), the Court stated that the right to jury trial did not
apply to the States, only to hold almost seventy years later that the jury right did, in fact, apply.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); see also, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (characterizing as dicta statements in prior decisions
that jury trial right is not a requisite of due process).
247 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) ("Our governing decisions
regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment's civil
jury requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation."). The Court declined to
incorporate the Seventh Amendment's civil jury right in Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis,
241 U.S. 211 (1916). There have been recent calls for the incorporation of the Seventh
Amendment's civil jury trial right. See, e.g., Clayton LaForge, Ripe for Incorporation: The Seventh
Amendment and the Civil Jury Trial, ABA LITIG. (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/committees/appellate-practice/articles/2015/fall201 5-1215-ripeincorporation-seventh-amendment-civil-jury-trial thttps://perma.cc/8GMP-4XBF].
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right is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty," or "dee[ply]

root[ed] in [this Nation's] history and tradition."248 Among these
touchstones for determining whether a right is essential to the
American tradition include its history and lineage, constitutional logic,
and policy considerations. Finally, this Part will examine the case for
incorporation under stare decisis principles.
A.

1.

History and Lineage

Antecedents, the Colonial Period, and the Founding

The grand jury enjoys a proud lineage, stretching back nearly a
millennium.249 The Constitutions of Clarendon and the Assize of
Clarendon, which constructed mechanisms for mediating the exercise
of criminal authority between the ecclesiastical and monarchical
realms, provided a blueprint for the protections the modern grand jury
250
The fourteenth-century Edwardian
would eventually represent.
advances in criminal procedural design-including the separation of

the accusatory function from the fact-finding function-would give
shape to the modern grand jury and contribute to its ultimate
significance.251 In the seventeenth century, the celebrated cases of
Stephen Colledge and the Earl of Shaftesbury saw the grand jury emerge
as valued protection of individual liberty against encroachment of the
22
Crown through politically motivated criminal prosecution. s
The grand jury's function as a shield between the individual and

the government would solidify itself on American soil, as the founding
generation found in colonial grand juries protection from King
George's exercise of colonial criminal authority in the eighteenth
century. 25 3 For example, the grand jury frustrated the Crown's
prosecution of a newspaper publisher being prosecuted for seditious
248 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019); see also supra Part II.
249 See BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.1.
250 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 144, at 408-09; Ric Simmons, Re-Examining
the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1,
4-5 (2002).
251 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 144 at 408-09 n.39.
252 See id. at 409 n.41; Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American GrandJury: Its
History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996); Simmons, supra note 250,
at 8.
253 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (1992); Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand
Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 67, 69-70 (1995); Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage,
supra note 144, at 409-10.
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libel in the wake of the publication of editorials highly critical of colonial

rule.254 Likewise, grand juries refused to indict colonists for violations
of British laws in the years leading up to the American Revolution.255
With the grand jury having played a significant role in the
resistance to British colonial rule, it is logical that the Framers of the
Constitution thought highly of the protection and its indispensability.
Notwithstanding the fact that only five of the thirteen former colonies
had a right to grand jury indictment referenced in their state
constitutions at the time of the Articles of Confederation,256 the Framers
included the right to grand jury indictment in the Fifth Amendment, as
part of the Bill of Rights, seeking to similarly restrain the criminal power
of the new federal government. 257
2.

The Antebellum Period and Reconstruction

The grand jury would continue to play a key role in the evolution
of the American identity after the Founding period. The influence of
grand juries would extend beyond their role in criminal cases.
Transcripts of charges to grand juries during the early nineteenth
century reveal their role as audience and sounding board for the
political disputes of the day.258 As the nation inched closer toward
division and civil war, the grand jury had solidified its place in
American life. Indeed, even the secessionist constitution of the

254 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 871-74 (1994); see also Ronald F. Wright, GrandJuries and
Expertise in the Administrative State, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND

JURY 295 (2011); Fairfax, supra note 217, at 722; Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law:
ConstitutionalEntitlement Versus JudicialInterpretation,33 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 452-53 (1999).
Although the government bypassed the grand jury and charged Zenger by information, the
colonial petit jury acquitted him. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND

RECONSTRUCTION 84-85 (1998); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution,65 ALA.
L. REV. 849, 858-59 (2014).
255 See Fairfax, supra note 217, at 722. The grand jury also played a substantial role in basic
local government, beyond its criminal procedural function. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 221-23 (1999); Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage,supra note 144, at 410 n.45.
256 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1193 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2005); see also
SCHWARTZ, supra note 253, at 76; Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage, supra note 144, at 410-11.
257 Although there is no reference to the grand jury in the original Constitution, there is a
reference to "indictment." See Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage, supra note 144, at 411 & n.52. This
further underscores the fundamental nature of grand jury indictment in the eighteenth century.
258 See, e.g., RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED

STATES, 1634-1941, at 47 (1963); John P. Kaminski & C. Jennifer Lawton, Duty and Justice at
"Every Man's Door": The GrandJury Chargesof ChiefJustice John Jay, 1790-1794, 31 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 235, 240-50 (2006).
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Confederacy contained a grand jury provision identical to that in the
2
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 59
After the Civil War, the grand jury retained its prominence even
as Black citizens were beginning to serve on grand juries during the
Reconstruction Era.26O Indeed, in the wake of anti-Black violence and
intimidation in the post-Civil War South, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871
created a cause of action targeting conspiracy to obstruct justice
through intimidating grand jurors or influencing grand jury
deliberations.2I
However, by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
only a little more than half of the thirty-seven states provided the right
to grand jury indictment.262 As Professors Calabresi and Agudo note:
Looking at the issue by population, it turns out that 51% of
Americans in 1868-again a bare majority-lived in states that

guaranteed the right to a grand jury indictment. Geographically, the
right to a grand jury was found in 58% of the Midwestern-Western

259 See CONSTITUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES of 1861, art. I,

§ 9,

cl. 16 ("No person

shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger .... ").
260 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Batson's Grand Jury DNA, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1511, 1516-24
(2012).
261 See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986). 42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides as follows:

.

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,
intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from
attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,
and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account
of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or
indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his
person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully
assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons
conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any
manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any
citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully
enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the
equal protection of the laws ...
42 U.S.C. § 1985; see also Brian J. Gaj, Section 1985(2) Clause One and Its Scope, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 756 (1985). It should be noted that the Ku Klux Klan Act creates a civil remedy. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of 1870, both established or amended the criminal
civil rights provisions now codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1996). See, e.g., United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
262 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, IndividualRights Under State Constitutions
when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 78 (2008) ("It turns out that only nineteen
states out of thirty-seven in 1868-a bare majority-guaranteed the right to presentment or
indictment by a grand jury for felonies (or capital and other infamous crimes).").
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state constitutions in 1868, in 50% of Northeastern state
constitutions, and in 47% of Southern state constitutions. It was
present in 50% of the pre-1855 constitutions and 53% of the post1855 constitutions. 263

Thus, not only did nearly half of all Americans live in a state
without the right to grand jury indictment in 1868,264 "there was no
Article V consensus of three-quarters of the states, nor was there a twothirds majority of the states protecting the right to a grand jury."265
3.

The Grand Jury After Hurtado

After the Court held, in the late nineteenth century, that the grand
jury was not a requisite of due process and, therefore, was not
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
States, the grand jury lost considerable prestige.266 Whether the
relationship between the Hurtado decision and the reduction in the
grand jury's standing was causal or correlative, the fact is that the
Framers likely would have been taken aback by the diminished
reputation of the grand jury of the twentieth century. 267
To be sure, the grand jury continued to play a role in American life
and the issues of the day. Grand juries were instrumental in the
investigation of corruption associated with big-city political machines
after the turn of the century, in the infamous McCarthy-era
investigations of alleged communists,268 the federal prosecution of civil
rights crimes and organized crime in the 1960s and 1970s,269 political
scandals in the 1970s270 and the 1990s,271 financial scandal and

263 Id. at 79.

See id.
265 Id. at 79. As Calabresi and Agudo have noted, "This could be argued to weigh in favor of
the non-incorporation of the grand jury requirement." Id. However, Professors Calabresi and
Agudo found that seven states in 1868 prohibited prosecution by information, which is the
primary substitute for prosecution by grand jury indictment. See id. at 79-80.
266 See supra Section II.B.
267 See Fairfax, GrandJury Innovation, supra note 144, at 346.
268 See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 287 & n.140 (1995); David J. Fine, Federal Grand Jury Investigation of
PoliticalDissidents, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 432 (1972).
269 See Fairfax, GrandJury Discretion,supra note 217, at 715 n.49.
270 See, e.g., Michael F. Buchwald, Of the People, by the People, for the People: The Role of
Special Grand Juries in Investigating Wrongdoing by Public Officials, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79,
82-83 (2007).
271 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997).
264
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272
counterterrorism investigations of the 2000s, and the investigation of

foreign influence in American presidential elections in more recent
years. 273

However, at the same time, there have been constant assaults on
the institution of the grand jury. This American anti-grand jury

sentiment followed the cue of the British, who entertained abolition of
the grand jury prior to World War I, suspended it during the war, and
ultimately abolished it altogether in 1933.274 In the United States,
criticisms of the grand jury have been lodged at both the state and
275
federal levels for more than a century now. Characterizing the grand

jury as ineffective, redundant, and a waste of resources, prominent
figures in the judiciary and legal academy called for its abolition or
curtailment.276 More recently, the high-profile cases in which grand
juries have failed to indict police officers who killed African Americans
allegedly without justification have renewed calls for abolition of the

grand jury.277 Today, roughly the same proportion-slightly more than
half-of states offer the guarantee of grand jury indictment as did in
1868.278

272 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale & James E. Felman, Enlisting and Deploying Federal Grand Juries
in the War on Terrorism, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY

(2011); Buchwald, supra note 270, at 91-93.
273 See, e.g., In re Application of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives,
For an Ord. Authorizing the Release of Certain Grand Jury Materials, 414 F. Supp. 3d 129 (D.D.C.
2019).
274 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 144, at 428 (citing Albert Lieck, Abolition of
the Grand Jury in England, 25 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623 (1934)).
275 See Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 144, at 429-30.
276 See id.; Fairfax, Grand Jury Innovation, supra note 144, at 341-45.
277 See infra Section III.C; Fairfax, Grand Jury's Role, supra note 4; Fairfax, Grand Jury Survive,
supra note 4, at 826 n.8.
278 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1435 n.28 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing
ARIZ. CONST., art. 2, § 30; ARK. CONST., amend. 21, § 1; CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 14; COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-5-205 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-46 (2017); HAW. CONST., art. I, § 10; IDAHO
CONST., art. I, § 8; ILL. COMP. STAT., ch. 725, § 5/111-2(a) (West 2018); IND. CODE § 35-34-11(a) (2019); Iowa Ct. Rule 2.5 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201 (2007); MD. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-102, 4-103 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.1 (1979); MO. CONST., art. I, § 17; MONT.
CONST., art. II, § 20(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1601 (2016); NEV. CONST., art. I, § 8; N.M. CONST.,
art II, § 14; N.D. Rule Crim. Proc. 7(a) (2018-2019); OKLA. CONST., art II, § 17; ORE. CONST.
(amended), art. VII, §§ 5(3)-(5); PA. CONST., art. I, § 10 (providing that "[e]ach of the several
courts of common pleas may, with the approval of the Supreme Court, provide for the initiation
of criminal proceedings therein by information"-a condition that has now been met in all
counties); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8931 (2015); S.D. CONST., ART. VI, § 10; UTAH CONST., art. I,
§ 13; VT. RULE CRIM. PROC. 7(a) (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.37.015 (2019); WIS. STAT.
§ 967.05 (2015-2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-106(a) (2019)); Calabresi & Agudo, supra note
262, at 78.
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ConstitutionalLogic
1.

Symmetry

The Court also has explored the question of whether a particular
right should be incorporated utilizing the touchstone of constitutional
logic. One such consideration is related to the debate between Justices
Black and Frankfurter over the concept of total incorporation. While it
is clear that Black's total incorporation theory failed to win the day,279
now that every other criminal procedural right has been incorporated
on a case-by-case basis, query whether it would make sense to
incorporate the grand jury right-the sole outlier-to apply to the states
as well.
One might read the desire for symmetry in the Court's rejection of
the dual-track incorporation theory embraced by Justice Powell.2o The
notion that rights should apply to constrain the federal government and
state governments equally and on the same terms is akin to the notion
that, where all of the protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights have
been incorporated to apply to the States, it is nonsensical (and
asymmetrical) to exclude just one. This is particularly so given that the
grand jury right is explicitly set forth in the text of the Fifth
Amendment, whereas other incorporated rights, such as jury unanimity
or the exclusionary rule, have no such explicit textual grounding and
are merely features of, or methods of implementing, rights as opposed
to rights themselves like the grand jury.
Although such symmetry arguments have surface appeal, the
project of selective incorporation unfolded over the course of a century
with the Court developing its approaches in the context of the concrete
constitutional right at issue. It is true that the Court has not been fully
consistent in the development of the principles governing its
incorporation inquiry.281 In addition, the Court decided Hurtadobefore
the era of selective incorporation began. However, there is an existing
theoretical framework in place to evaluate the case for the incorporation
of the grand jury right.282 Rather than arbitrarily including the grand
jury right to avoid having it exist as an outlier, the more prudent course

279 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 761-63 (2010).
280 See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1398.
281 See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 759-66.
282 See supra Section I.B.
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would be to apply the criteria used to test other rights deemed to be
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."283
2.
a.

Bundle of Sticks

The Grand Jury's Screening Function

Part of the theoretical difficulty surrounding the grand jury is that
it pursues several separate and distinct constitutional and practical

values-a bundle of sticks, so to speak. The first of these sticks is the

grand jury's function as a screening mechanism. The grand jury, as a
lay entity, assesses the merits of potential criminal charges.284 In doing

so, the grand jury reviews the evidence in the matter and determines
whether there is probable cause to support proposed charges.285 Often,
those charges are proposed by the government. However, in the grand

jury's tradition, the body has played a role in considering charges
surfaced by private individuals.286 In addition, the grand jury has a
largely dormant, but still existent, power to consider and bring charges

itself.287 Notably, as discussed above, this screening mechanism is one

2 88
that the HurtadoCourt held is not a requisite of due process. In other

words, Hurtado and its progeny held that a state may dispense with
grand jury review and, instead, permit prosecution of a defendant for
289
charges that were reviewed by the prosecutorfor probable cause.

283 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Gluksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997));
see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686-87 (2019) (quoting McDonald).
284 See, e.g., BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, § 1:7; Fairfax, GrandJury Discretion, supra note 217,
at 707-08.
285 See, e.g., BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, § 4:14.

286 See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over CriminalLaw Enforcement: Some Lessons from
History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 292-93 (1989). In the era before the public prosecutor, the grand
jury served as an arbiter between private accusers and the accused. See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411,
422-23 n.33 (2009); see also I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561,
1573-81 (2020).
287 See, e.g., Lettow, supra note 218.
288 See supra Section II.B.
289 In Hurtado, the Court actually held that a prosecutor's filing of an information prompted
by a magistrate's review of the evidence and certification that there is sufficient cause, was an
adequate substitute for grand jury indictment. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
("[W]e are unable to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of
the proceeding by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to
the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the
cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution, is not due process of law."); see
also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,292 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, the Court later
suggested that due process required only the information, without the necessity of a prior judicial
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The Grand Jury's Notice Function

Closely related to the screening function, is another stick in the
bundle-the notice function. When the grand jury approves charges, it
returns an indictment. An indictment is a formal charging document
that specifies the charges being brought, and it provides a concise
summary of the allegations against the defendant.29o The significance of
this document should not be understated. First, it provides the notice
essential to due process. Indeed, the Sixth Amendment requires that a
criminal defendant be "informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation."291 Such basic notice of the allegations is required in a
system that condemns star chamber-like procedures, and such notice
also promotes fairness and transparency in the process attending the
government's attempt to burden an individual's liberty.
This notice is critical to other important rights as well. The right to
counsel would be burdened if the defense lawyer were not made aware
of the particulars of the allegations in preparing a defense or motion to
dismiss. Likewise, the exercise of other Sixth Amendment rights,
including ensuring proper venue, confrontation rights, and utilization
of compulsory process is dependent on the notice of charges the
indictment provides. In addition, certain Fifth Amendment rights are
bolstered by the grand jury indictment. For instance, notice of the
allegations could factor into whether a defendant can provide certain
evidence or make sworn statements without compromising the
privilege against self-incrimination.292 Furthermore, the specificity
around the charges being advanced in a criminal case empowers the
defendant to raise the double jeopardy bar against a future prosecution,
whether or not the defendant was convicted or acquitted of the original
charges.293
With all that said, a prosecutor's information arguably can provide
the same notice that a grand jury indictment provides. Indeed, the
format of the information is virtually identical to that of the indictment,
except in two significant ways. 294 The allegations contained in the
determination of probable cause. See Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) ("But since,
as this court has so often held, the 'due process of law' clause does not require the state to adopt
the institution and procedure of a grand jury, we are unable to see upon what theory it can be
held that an examination, or the opportunity for one, prior to the formal accusation by the district
attorney is obligatory upon the states.").
290 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1); BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, § 8:1.
291 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

292 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.").
293 See id. ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb.").
294 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c).
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29
information are those of the prosecutor, not of the grand jury. 5 In

addition, the information is signed by the prosecutor who, in doing so,
certifies that the evidence establishes probable cause that the defendant
committed the offenses outlined in the information.296 On the other
hand, an indictment states that "the Grand Jury alleges" and is signed
297
by the foreperson of the grand jury. The significance of the difference
between a prosecutor certifying to probable cause and the lay grand jury
so certifying is important. An indictment, as an articulation of
allegations found credible by a body of the defendant's peers, carries
with it the heft of community condemnation that perhaps a prosecutor's

information does not. To say that a defendant has been "indicted by a
grand jury" is likely to generate greater stigma than the prosecutor's
mere unchecked allegation of criminal conduct.298
c.

The Grand Jury and Popular Discretion

The grand jury also is a vehicle for discretion in charging. It has

often been said that the grand jury is a font of community wisdom.299

295 See, e.g., CECILY FUHR, GLENDA K. HARNAD, MICHELE HUGHES, JOHN KIMPFLEN
WILLIAM LINDSLEY, C.J.S. $ 104 (2021).
296 See id. $ 108.

&

The grand jury, typically ranging in size from twelve to twenty-three
individuals, is positioned to represent a broad cross-section of the
community.300 As such, the grand jury is able to bring to bear its own
judgment on the propriety of criminal charges beyond the foundational
question of whether the evidence establishes probable cause. Given the
grand jury's heritage in the American colonies as a mechanism of
resistance to British colonial laws or the unfair enforcement of those
laws,301 some have recognized that grand jury's discretionary role in the
02
initiation of criminal prosecution even in contemporary times.3 This
lay judgment and discretion represents another stick in the bundle, one

297 See id. § 68.

298 See Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 329 (2014).
299 See Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and CriminalJustice,
11 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1416-17 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of "The People" in Criminal
Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 263-64, 264 n.53 (2019); see also United States v. Smyth, 104
F. Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1952) ("The grand jury breathes the spirit of a community into the
enforcement of law.").
300 See Brenner, supra note 253, at 78; Fairfax, supra note 217, at 745.
301 See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Does GrandJury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and Useful) Role
to Play in CriminalJustice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 57-

58 (2011) [hereinafter Fairfax, GrandJury Discretion'sRole] ("Where the grand jury truly adds
value is through its ability to exercise robust discretion not to indict where probable cause
nevertheless exists-what some might term 'grand jury nullification."').
302 See Niki Kuckes, The DemocraticProsecutor:Explainingthe ConstitutionalFunction of the
FederalGrand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1313-17 (2006); Fairfax, supra note 217, at 743-52.
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that the prosecution by mere information cannot deliver-a point made
all the more significant by the recognition that the grand jury right
represents an "immunity" to the burden and stigma of accusation and
prosecution.303
3.

The Grand Jury's Enigmatic Nature

The grand jury's enigmatic nature presents another complication
of assessing its essentialism to American democracy. First, the grand
jury is "both [a] shield and [a] sword."304 Although the grand jury's
value can be characterized by the rights represented in the
aforementioned bundle of sticks, it is also an investigative tool, and a
powerful one at that. The grand jury is perhaps the most potent weapon
in the government's arsenal. The subpoena power the grand jury
possesses can reach "every man's evidence,"305 and is subject to no limits
outside of constitutional, statutory, or recognized common law
privileges.306 Also, the ability to place witnesses under oath and lock in
their testimony under pain and penalty of perjury provides the
government advantages later at trial as well. The grand jury's role as a
"sword" as well as a "shield" complicates the consideration of whether
it is "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty."307
Another enigmatic feature of the grand jury is that it is an entity
unto itself, with a long and storied history. It has been described as a
"pre-constitutional institution,"308 and it has a legacy that extends well
beyond criminal procedure. Whereas the petit jury is closely associated
with and subsumed within the judicial branch of government, the grand
jury is actually thought to exist independently, outside of the three
branches. Properly understood, the grand jury has served as a check on
the judicial, executive, and legislative branches.309 In this way, it serves
303 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 551-52 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The right
of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the
trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial, before a probable cause is established by the
presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high offences, is justly regarded as one of
the securities to the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions, and
as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty.").
304 BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, § 1:7.
305 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
306 See id.
307 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 686 (2019); see also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273,
282 (1919).
308 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal citations omitted);
see also Fairfax, GrandJury Discretion'sRole, supra note 301, at 726-27.
309 See United States v. williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (describing the grand jury as a
"constitutional fixture in its own right" (internal citations omitted)).
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a distinct structural role, as well as a rights-promoting role.310 The grand
jury, unlike the petit jury, historically played a robust role in American

civic life.
In addition to its core function of determining whether criminal
cases would proceed to trial, the grand jury also oversaw revenue and
spending, public works projects, and the conduct of public officials.311
In many ways, it served as an organ of local government. Relatedly,
although the racial and gender exclusion that has marked the nation's
history constrains the ability to characterize the grand jury as being
representative, the grand jury ostensibly has sought to embody
representative ideals. Accordingly, the courts have turned back

attempts to undermine that representativeness through discriminatory
means.

312

Furthermore, the parameters of the grand jury as an entity have
not been well-defined. The petit jury has been the subject of extensive
jurisprudential evaluation of what a jury is.313 Features such as jury size,
unanimity, and methods of deliberation have been frequently examined

by the courts. 314 However, the same cannot be said about the grand jury.
Although the courts have provided guidance on certain requisites, such

as the role of a foreperson and the notion that grand jury proceedings

are not meant to approximate a trial,315 little has been said about what a
grand jury is or what it must look like as a matter of constitutional
law.316 However, like with the jury trial right, the right to grand jury
indictment "surely mean[s] something."317 A lack of clarity regarding

the parameters of the grand jury right also frustrates consensus that it
is essential to our democracy.

310 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Discretion's Role, supra note 301, at 726-27.
311 See LEVY, supra note 255, at 221-23; Fairfax, Jurisdictional Heritage, supra note 144, at 410
n.45.
312 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 260, at 1516-24.
313 Cf Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020) ("[T]he promise of a jury trial surely
meant something-otherwise, there would have been no reason to write it down.").
314 See, e.g., Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1394-95; Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
315 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1992).
the "one-man" grand
316 That said, the Court has discussed-and approved-a state's use of
the rationales
jury. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 261-63 (1948). The Court also has discussed
secrecy on
imposing
rule
federal
the
of
context
the
in
and
behind grand jury secrecy generally
grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. 418 (1983); In re Oliver,
333 U.S. at 264-65; Daniel Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket,
U.S.
36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 352-53 (1999) (citing Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Oil Stops Nw., 411
211, 219 n.10 (1979)). It should also be noted that, although grand jury indictment has not been
incorporated to apply to the States, if a state does utilize the grand jury, then the Federal
Constitution speaks to certain issues, such as discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. See,
e.g., Fairfax, supra note 260, at 1528 n.100.
317 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1395.
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Policy

The Court also has transparently included policy considerations in
its evaluation of whether a criminal procedural right is to be
incorporated to apply to the States. This third touchstone presents
perhaps the most formidable challenge to the case for the incorporation
of the grand jury right. The difficulty begins with the low esteem in
which the grand jury is held in American legal culture.318 To be sure, the
Hurtado Court's decision not to incorporate the grand jury right
certainly set the grand jury on its course of unpopularity. However, even
in the federal system and in the more than twenty states in which the
grand jury is required, the grand jury comes under frequent criticism.319
1.

The Grand Jury's Effectiveness

One of the reasons many condemn the grand jury is because of its
perceived high rate of indictment. Although grand jury return statistics
are not always easy to come by, some data reveal that grand juries nearly
always return an indictment against a defendant when the prosecutor
requests one. 320 For example, in one recent year, federal grand juries
declined to return an indictment in a tiny percentage of the cases
reviewed.321 This had led some to believe the canard that a grand jury
"would indict a ham sandwich."322
While these statistics certainly may supply cause for skepticism,
they do not tell the entire story. Importantly, the data capture only cases
in which prosecutors are asking for an indictment. There is no
requirement that the prosecutor request the grand jury to approve an
indictment even after evidence has been presented. Where a prosecutor
does not have confidence that the grand jury will approve the charges,
the case can simply be withdrawn. Given this, the statistics do not fully
reflect the grand jury's potential skepticism or resistance to charges in
those cases. 3 23

318 See, e.g., Fairfax, JurisdictionalHeritage, supra note 144, at 428-30.
319 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195-96 (2005).
320 See, e.g., MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2010-

STATISTICAL TABLES 12 (2013); Simmons, supra note 250, at 31-32.
321 See Simmons, supra note 250, at 31-32; Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly Rarefor a Grand
Jury to Do What Ferguson's Just Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:30 PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ferguson-michael-brown-indictment-darren-wfson
[https://perma.cc/C7MT-XF8M].
322 See Navarro-Vargas,408 F.3d at 1195 (internal citations omitted).
323 See, e.g., Fairfax, Grand Jury Innovation, supra note 144, at 342-43.
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Also, it is important to understand that the grand jury presentation
process is quite fluid and dynamic. Unlike in the petit jury context, the
prosecutor in the grand jury can informally poll the grand jurors at any
time regarding potential gaps in the evidence or weaknesses in the case.
If any such deficiencies exist, the prosecutor can cure them before
asking the grand jurors to vote on the indictment, and if the prosecutor

is unable to rectify issues with the case, she can withdraw it before the
vote. Such cases do not show up in the statistics.324
Finally, the fact that the grand jury's review of a proposed charge

is often confirmed by other criminal justice actors may cut against the
notion that grand juries are too pliable. Most criminal cases are resolved
by a guilty plea.325 Even though a case indicted by a grand jury is more
likely to proceed to trial than the typical case, some are disposed by a
guilty plea when the defendant decides to strike a plea bargain with the
government. In such situations, the government has to allocute as to the
facts it believes it could prove at trial with evidence beyond a reasonable

doubt.326 In addition, the presiding judge must determine that there is a

factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea.327 Furthermore, for the cases
that proceed to trial, the petit jury or the judge applies a much higher
standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-than the probable
328
cause standard applied by the grand jury. Nevertheless, the rate of

conviction at trial is quite high, which can be seen as corroborating the
earlier grand jury review of the evidence.329
2.

Potential Disruption

Another policy consideration concerns the disruption to state
criminal legal systems that would be caused by a decision to incorporate
the right to grand jury at this late date. There are twenty-eight states
33 0
that do not utilize the grand jury to initiate most serious prosecutions.
By contrast, the Court's recent incorporation of the right to jury
unanimity impacted only the two states that still permitted
nonunanimous verdicts.331 Even the incorporation of the petit jury right
324 See id. at 342-44.
325 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, JudicialFact-Findingand Sentence Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001).
in the
326 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Thinking Outside the Jury Box: Deploying the Grand Jury
(2016).
1406
1395,
REV.
L.
MARY
&
WM.
57
Process,
Plea
Guilty
327 See id. at 1406-07.
328 See, e.g., Fairfax, GrandJury Innovation, supra note 144, at 342-43.
329 See id.

330 See supra Part II.
331 See supra Section I.B.2.
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itself in Duncan v. Louisiana only impacted the small number of states
that did not provide jury trial for all serious crimes at that time.332
To incorporate the Fifth Amendment grand jury right would
require these states to fundamentally alter their charging procedures.
Not only would this necessitate a reworking of the charging process, but
it likely would have an impact on other pretrial procedures, such as
pretrial detention hearings. Furthermore, such a change would impose
financial costs, both in establishing technology infrastructure and
courthouse personnel related to the summoning and oversight of grand
jurors, and in the construction or adaptation of physical spaces to
accommodate the grand juries' work.333
Additionally, the incorporation of the grand jury right could
threaten to bring the already-slow criminal processing system in many
states to a grinding halt as states scramble to establish grand juries and
get them up and running. This could work to the disadvantage of many
defendants, particularly those who are detained and would have their
cases delayed. Also, the application of the grand jury right to the States
would call into question literally millions of prior convictions obtained
without grand jury indictment. Although retroactive application of the
right is not a given,334 it is a concern that courts have noticed. However,
query whether concerns such as costs and efficiency, and caseloads
should carry weight in the determination of whether a right is
fundamental to the provision of due process for incorporation
purposes. 335
3.

Breonna, Tamir, Michael, and Eric

The most damning indictment of the grand jury in recent years has
been borne of the string of high-profile cases in which grand juries have
declined to indict police officers accused of unjustifiably killing African
Americans.336 In Missouri, a grand jury declined to indict former officer
Darren Wilson, who shot and killed eighteen-year-old Michael
Brown.337 In Staten Island, a grand jury declined to indict former officer
Daniel Pantaleo, who administered an illegal chokehold and killed

332 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968).
333 However, it should be noted that even in many states with no constitutional requirement
of grand jury indictment, there exist grand juries. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 6, $ 1:1.
334 See, e.g., Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1407 (2020).
335 See infra Section III.D.
336 See generally Fairfax, GrandJury's Role, supra note 4.
337 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 214-15.
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forty-three-year-old Eric Garner.338 In Ohio, a grand jury declined to
indict former officer Tim Loehmann, who shot and killed twelve-yearold Tamir Rice while he was playing with a toy gun at a playground.339
And, in the midst of worldwide protests in the wake of the police killing
of a handcuffed George Floyd in Minneapolis, a Kentucky grand jury
declined to charge any of the three former Louisville police officers with
responsibility for the killing of twenty-six-year-old Breonna Taylor
during a botched and ill-advised raid of her apartment in the middle of
the night.340
These and other similar grand jury decisions have prompted
outcry and even calls for the abolition of the grand jury as the questions
341
about these outcomes continue to mount. While there are structural
342
many in the
issues that contribute to these grand jury outcomes,

affected communities have lost patience with the excuses offered as
more examples of grand jury refusals to indict are added to the list.x34
This frustration is exacerbated by the recognition that, as discussed
above, grand juries are perceived to be particularly willing to indict in
most cases. However, they appear to be more reluctant "in cases where

police officers are accused of taking the life of a Black or brown
person."344
Although there are no easy answers, it is clear that ensuring the
independence of the prosecutor is a key factor in successfully charging

police officers who unjustifiably take a life in the line of duty.345
Prosecutors work closely with police officers in the investigation and

&

338 See id. at 215-16.
339 See id. at 217-18.
Usually
340 See Mark Berman, Breonna Taylor's Case Shines Spotlight on Grand Juries, Which
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
2020),
2,
(Oct.
POST
WASH.
Eye,
Public
of
Operate out
national/breonna-taylors-case-shines-spotlight-on-grand-juries-which-usually-operate-out-ofpublic-eye/2020/10/01/9b9b078c-043f-11eb-b7ed-141dd88560ea_story [https://perma.cc/B95Sof Blame
6XLK]; Shaila Dewan, Will Wright & John Eligon, In the Breonna Taylor Case, a Battle 9 2 9
/ /us/
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/0
over the Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/W6YW-CSRW].
breonna-taylor-grand-jury.html?searchResultPosition=l
341 See Fairfax, Grand Jury Survive, supra note 4, at 825-27.
342 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 219-28; see also Brie McLemore, ProceduralJustice, Legal
Estrangement, and the Black People's Grand Jury, 105 VA. L. REV. 371 (2019); Gabriel J. Chin
John Ormonde, Infamous Misdemeanors and the Grand Jury Clause, 102 MINN. L. REv. 1911,
1913 (2018).
343 See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, Rochester Officers Will Not Be Charged in Killing of Daniel
Prude,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/nyregion/daniel-pruderochester-police.html [https://perma.cc/A6D8-WC7M].
344 Dewan, Wright & Eligon, supra note 340. But see Noelle Phillips & Elise Schmelzer, Elijah
McClain Case: GrandJury Indicts Police, Paramedics in Death, DENV. POST (Sept. 2, 2021, 2:34
https://www.denverpost.com/2021/09/01/elijah-mcclain-grand-jury-aurora-police
PM),

[https://perma.cc/V64M-5BDX].
345 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 227-28.
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prosecution of criminal conduct, and, therefore, it may be asking too
much of prosecutors to set aside their working relationship with law
enforcement officers to conduct an aggressive and, if necessary,
antagonistic investigation into an officer's conduct.346 However,
appointing an independent prosecutor is not a panacea. As recent cases
have demonstrated, some independent prosecutors do not command
the trust of the community that they have sought justice,347 and still
others who are perceived to have acted in good faith might still be
frustrated by the facts or the law despite their best efforts to seek an
indictment.348
As disappointing as the recent grand jury decisions have been for
those concerned with racial justice, it is important to remember that the
alternative to grand jury indictment-prosecution by information-is
only as effective as the prosecutor making the decision. The same
reasons that prosecutorial independence is critical in many cases also
animate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these cases when
grand jury indictment is not required.349 If a prosecutor is not inclined
to thoroughly investigate and, if the evidence warrants it, prosecute
police officers, then it will not matter whether or not the grand jury is

involved.
Furthermore, certain grand jurors in recent cases have sought to
speak up and shine a light on alleged lapses or misconduct on the part
of prosecutors who presented matters to the grand jury. 350 For instance,
a number of grand jurors in the Breonna Taylor case petitioned the
court to obtain the right to tell their side of the story contradicting the
prosecutor's account of why the grand jury did not return an indictment
346 See id. To be sure, there is more than one school of thought on whether the local prosecutor
should always be replaced by an independent prosecutor. See Fairfax, GrandJury's Role, supra
note 4, at 417 & n.126.
347 See, e.g., Marisa Iati, Breonna Taylor GrandJury Was Not Given Option to Bring Homicide
Charges, Anonymous Juror Says, WASH.
POST (Oct.
20, 2020,
7:18 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/breonna-taylor-grand-jury-was-not-given-optionto-bring-homicide-charges-anonymous-juror-says/2020/10/20/bdd2912e-101c-1leb-ble816b59b92b36dstory.html [https://perma.cc/64TR-GVL2].
348 See, e.g., Press Release, Letitia James, Att'y Gen., Attorney General James Releases
Statement on Grand Jury Decision Regarding the Death of Daniel Prude (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2021 /attorney-general-james-releases-statement-grand-jurydecision-regarding-death [https://perma.cc/FN3X-AURA].
349 See Fairfax, supra note 3, at 228-29.
350 See, e.g., Tessa Duvall, Two Breonna Taylor Grand Jurors Are Telling Their Story. Why
That's Important, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Oct. 27, 2020, 5:40 PM), https://www.courierjournal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/ 10/27/two-breonna-taylor-grand-jurorstelling-their-story/6051938002 [https://perma.cc/HYE3-349K]; Debra Cassens Weiss, 8th Circuit
Rules Against Grand Juror Who Wanted to Talk About Michael Brown Case, ABA J. (Aug. 19,
2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/8th-circuit-rules-against-grandjuror-who-wanted-to-talk-about-michael-brown-case [https://perma.cc/2RF7-P34Q].
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containing charges connected to the death of Breonna Taylor.351 This
emerging independence being displayed could be a harbinger of a less
passive model of grand jury engagement in these types of cases.
In addition, prosecutors could deploy the grand jury to advance
35 2
racial justice in other ways. For example, a prosecutor could use the
grand jury to investigate systemic misconduct in police departments.
Using the grand jury's subpoena power, a prosecutor could probe
whether a department engaged in a coverup of misconduct, or the
extent to which racial supremacist groups have gotten a foothold in a
particular department.3s3 Even beyond policing, the prosecutor could
pursue a racial justice agenda utilizing the grand jury to investigate

conditions of confinement in the local jail facility, or the improper

influence of the private prison industry on legislators and judges.354 In
this way, the grand jury, which is often conceptualized as a shield for
the accused, also might be used as a sword in the quest for racial justice.

4.

The Enduring (and Future) Relevance of the Grand Jury

Finally, the Court might consider what the grand jury could

become if the right were to be incorporated. As discussed, part of the

reason the grand jury enjoys so little respect is that it was relegated to

second-class status in Hurtado.355Inclusion of the grand jury right with
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights to have been deemed
fundamental to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment would
surely enhance the respect that it carries. Also, the greater exposure of
more Americans to the institution of the grand jury could work to

elevate its standing.
On a related note, the incorporation of the grand jury right-and

the concomitant increased utilization of the institution of the grand
jury-could serve to fuel the imagination about how the "voice of the
community" might be deployed beyond the review of criminal
charges.356 Courts and scholars often reference the vaunted history of
the grand jury in which it played a central role in civic life which
357
enhanced its value in the criminal process. Should the grand jury be
351 See Tessa Duvall, supra note 350.
352 See Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutors,Ethics, and the Pursuit of Racial Justice, 19 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2022).
353 See id.
354 See id.
355 See supra Section II.A.
356 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 253; Fairfax, Grand Jury Innovation, supra note 144, at 35468.
357 See supra Section III.A; wright, supra note 254, at 294-96.
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living that history now? Indeed, scholars have imagined a similarly
more vibrant role for the grand jury, proposing its use as a vehicle for
nontraditional purposes, such as approving criminal sentences,
regulating plea bargaining, and overseeing prosecutorial conduct and
enforcement priorities.358
Creative uses of the grand jury, harnessing its power of community
wisdom and input might help the grand jury to be seen not as a mere
speed bump in the criminal legal system, but as an engine or steering
wheel.359 In this way, this ancient body could be viewed as an enduring
and valuable part of the criminal legal system worth preserving and
adapting to the needs of modern society. Perhaps this robust vision of
the grand jury could both help justify the incorporation of the grand
jury right and be bolstered by it.
D.

Entitlement to Deference Under Stare Decisis?

However one might perceive the critique of the Hurtado decision
or how it would fare under an analysis employing the touchstones of
modern incorporation doctrine, the case is still good law.360 In
interrogating the case for the incorporation of the grand jury right, we
must acknowledge that the Court has long adhered to the doctrine of
stare decisis, which generally counsels for caution in overturning
precedents.361 These precedents, the Court has noted, "warrant our deep
respect as embodying the considered views of those who have come
before."362 However, as the Court also has acknowledged, "stare decisis
has never been treated as an 'inexorable command."'363 This is
particularly so in cases involving the interpretation of constitutional
provisions.364 To navigate these competing interests, the Court has
considered several traditional guideposts for overturning precedent,
358 Cf. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010); see also Fairfax, supra note
326, at 1402-05; Fairfax, GrandJuryInnovation, supra note 144, at 354-68.
359 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1169, 1193 (1995) (citing Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 465 (1992)).
360 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1435 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting).
361 See, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 118 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
("We
generally adhere to our prior decisions, even if we question their soundness, because doing so
'promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process."' (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
362 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405.
363 Id.
364 See id. (noting that the doctrine of stare decisis is "at its weakest when we interpret the
Constitution" (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997))).
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including "the quality of the decision's reasoning; its consistency with

related decisions; legal developments since the decision; and reliance on
the decision."365
1.

Quality of Reasoning

As discussed above, the Hurtado decision featured a lengthy
explication of the relationship of the Bill of Rights provisions to the

fundamental due process guaranteed against state interference under
the Fourteenth Amendment.366 Although we have had the benefit of
reviewing 140 years of incorporation jurisprudence unfold since
Hurtado was decided in 1884, the Court was engaged in the fairly new
enterprise of determining how the post-Civil War amendments had
changed the nature of federalism and the protection of rights in a
rapidly changing and growing country post-slavery and postReconstruction.
The reasoning undergirding the Hurtadomajority's position, read
in the context of the time in which it was rendered, certainly is
defensible. "Due process of law," the Court maintained, had no strict
requirement for particular procedural mechanisms, and certainly did
not necessarily incorporate the provisions of the Bill of Rights meant to

constrain the federal government. Under this "pragmatic procedural
federalism" approach, as long as a state was not infringing upon
fundamental due process interests, it was free to experiment with

various procedural forms suited to its evolving needs and to the modern
context.

367

However, as Harlan's dissent asserted, there are flaws in this
reasoning. The logic that would exclude the grand jury from the

conception of due process because the grand jury right is enumerated
in the same provision guaranteeing due process of law, would also

exclude other similarly enumerated rights that have been deemed
fundamental to due process. In addition, the fact that the grand jury,
earlier in its eight-hundred-year evolution had not always been as
protective of individual liberty is beside the point. The question is
whether the Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments believed

that the grand jury right, as it existed and functioned at the time of the
Founding and at the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was
fundamental to due process. By the time of those eras, the grand jury

had established a proud history in the colonies and the States as a
365 Id. (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019)).

366 See supra Section II.A.
367 See supra Section II.C.
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protector of individual liberty and was arguably seen as essential to due
process. 368
Furthermore, the Hurtado majority gave short shrift to the
particular value the grand jury brings to the exercise of ensuring that

defendants are not unfairly saddled with the burdens of accusation.
Although the California magistrate examination and prosecution-byinformation procedure approved in Hurtado as a substitute for grand
jury indictment did offer certain features the grand jury typically does
not, the grand jury is a lay body of the defendant's peers, not beholden
to the government, insulated from outside influence, and better suited
to bring community wisdom to the exercise of scrutinizing the ethical,
moral, and practical merits of a proposed prosecution alongside its
evidentiary merits.369
Finally, the Hurtadomajority did not make explicit what exactly is
required to ensure due process in connection with the initiation of
criminal charges. Although the decision did determine that substituting
for grand jury indictment the particular magistrate commitment and
information process used in California did not violate due process of
law, it did not make clear that a state must provide some sort of review
of the merits of initiating prosecution. As a result, the Court's
subsequent decisions soon had forgotten the portion of the holding
approving the magistrate commitment and had embraced the view that
Hurtado stood for the proposition simply that the grand jury
indictment was not a requisite of due process. Thus, fewer than thirty

years after Hurtado, the Court declared that a defendant is entitled to
no review of the prosecutor's decision to lodge criminal charges and
subject the accused to the burdens and stigma associated with the onset
of criminal proceedings.370
2.

Consistency with Related Decisions and Legal Developments
Since the Decision

The next two traditional stare decisis guideposts-consistency
with related decisions and legal developments since the decision-are
closely related in this context. As discussed above, Hurtadopredated the
era of selective incorporation.371 The case was decided in the period just
after Reconstruction-as state and federal courts alike were grappling
with the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment-and prior to the
368 See supra Section III.A.
369 See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 302; Fairfax, supra note 217.

370 See Lem woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913).
371 See supra Section III.B.
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Court's adoption of the approach that would begin its project of
selectively incorporating enumerated rights in the first eight
amendments to apply to the States. Thus, the evolving touchstones and
incorporation approaches the Court would apply throughout the
twentieth century were not applied in Hurtado. Certainly, the more
modern incorporation touchstones, which consider not only history,
but also logic and policy considerations, were not prominent in the 1884

Hurtadodecision.
Furthermore, aside from the fact that the methodology of selective

incorporation was not utilized in Hurtado, the substantive outcomes of
criminal procedural rights cases decided by the Court during the era of
selective incorporation are significant. As discussed above, the Court
has now considered every single criminal procedural right enumerated

in, or made implicit by, the Bill of Rights.372 For every one of those
rights, the Court has decided to incorporate them through the
373
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the States. Furthermore, it bears

reiterating that with several of these now-incorporated criminal
procedural rights, the Court first had decided the right was not
incorporated but, as its incorporation doctrine evolved, the Court
3 74
reversed course.
3.

Reliance on the Decision

Finally, the Court considers the extent of reliance on the decision.
For example, in Ramos, the Court noted that the respondent States
opposing the incorporation of the right to jury unanimity failed to claim
"anything like the prospective economic, regulatory, or social
disruption litigants seeking to preserve precedent usually invoke."375 As

discussed earlier in this Part, the incorporation of the grand jury right
to apply to the States likely would lead to significant disruption in terms

of process and infrastructure, and would introduce costs associated

with integrating the grand jury into state systems in which it is currently

absent.376 These States certainly could fairly assert their reliance on the
1884 Hurtado decision when first designing their case processing

systems, and could point to the vast changes the incorporation of the
grand jury right would mandate for the manner in which most serious

criminal cases are initiated.
372 See supra Section I.A.

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.
375 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
376 See supra Section III.C.
373
374

S. Ct.

1390, 1406 (2020).
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Obviously, the incorporation of any criminal procedural rightwhether the right to jury trial, the exclusionary rule, or the privilege
against self-incrimination-brings a certain degree of disruption.377
This disruption might be assessed across two different metrics-the
number of states impacted by the ruling and the impact of the ruling
within those states. For example, the Ramos Court noted that its
decision to incorporate the right to jury unanimity in criminal cases
would significantly impact only the two states then still permitting
nonunanimous verdicts.378 Of course, in contrast, the incorporation of
the grand jury right would have a significant impact on roughly half of

the fifty states.
That said, the States' reliance interests, however, would need to be
balanced with other important considerations. The Ramos Court also
emphasized that "new rules of criminal procedures usually do [impose
a cost], often affecting significant numbers of pending cases across the
whole country."379 The new rules, and virtually all of the prior instances
of incorporation of criminal procedural rights have come with
substantial costs and disruption to the status quo for states that were
forced to adapt.380 While it is true that states can claim to have relied on

377 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1406.
378 See id. at 1394, 1406.
379 Id. at 1406.

380 Cf. id. at 1406 ("For example, after Booker v. United States held that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines must be advisory rather than mandatory, this Court vacated and remanded nearly 800
decisions to the courts of appeals. Similar consequences likely followed when Crawford v.
Washington overturned prior interpretations of the Confrontation Clause or Arizona v. Gant
changed the law for searches incident to arrests."). The Ramos Court also discounted the concern
about finality of convictions given the current state of the law regarding retroactivity and the fact
that "the test [for retroactivity] is demanding by design, expressly calibrated to address the
reliance interests States have in the finality of their criminal judgments." Id. at 1407. Indeed, the
Court closed the door on retroactivity of watershed rules of criminal procedure when it
subsequently held that jury unanimity does not meet the test for retroactivity. See Edwards v.
Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547, 1559-60 (2021).
[W]e recognize that the Court's many retroactivity precedents taken together
raise a legitimate question: If landmark and historic criminal procedure
decisions-including Mapp, Miranda, Duncan, Crawford, Batson, and now
Ramos-do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review, how can any
additional new rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively on federal
collateral review? At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only
candid answer is that none can-that is, no new rules of criminal procedure can
satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest
otherwise to litigants and courts.... It is time-probably long past time-to
make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the
last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral
review. The watershed exception is moribund. It must "be regarded as retaining
no vitality."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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the Hurtadodecision longer than it had relied on any other of the nowoverturned decisions not to incorporate core criminal procedure rights,
the fact that the Court happened to decide the case before the era of

selective incorporation should not add weight to the reliance interest.
CONCLUSION

Should the grand jury right be incorporated to apply to the States,
as is the case with every other criminal procedural protection enshrined

in the Bill of Rights? It is fair to ask why this question is worth answering
now. To be sure, since the Court's late nineteenth-century-Hurtado
decision, we seem to have reached a point of stasis, with a little fewer
than half the States choosing to utilize the grand jury in serious criminal

cases, and the balance of states dispensing with it completely or making
its use optional in all but the most narrow of circumstances. Those states

in the cohort that use the grand jury largely follow the path that the

federal grand jury system has beaten, in terms of both substance and

procedure. This has led to a divided approach, which is not uncommon
in our system of federalism.381 Furthermore, the grand jury, which
already had been facing heavy criticism, has drawn a new cohort of

detractors who are understandably frustrated by the institution's recent

track record in cases involving police violence against African
38 2
Americans and other marginalized groups.
So, with the passage of time, inertia, and the old and new critiques

of the grand jury's relevance and value, why would we even contemplate

anything other than a move toward abolition of the grand jury, much

less consider bolstering the institution through incorporation? We are
in the midst of a moment in which the legal culture is reimagining roles

that were all but settled for various criminal justice actors such as

prosecutors and law enforcement.383 There is an ongoing rethinking of
substantive criminal law policies, such as mandatory minimum

sentencing,

criminalization,

and

traditional

mechanisms

of

For example, some states have jury sentencing, some do not; some states have elected
of
prosecutors, others do not. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, How Criminal Law Dictates Rules
(2018).
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381
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punishment.384 In this time of reexamination, conventional wisdom is
no longer at a premium. Thinkers are free to question long-settled
assumptions about the nature and efficacy of certain aspects of the
criminal legal system. It should be no different with the grand jury.
Although the Court's incorporation of rights has been largely a
retrospective exercise, perhaps it is the forward-looking consideration
of the grand jury's promise that best establishes the case for applying
the right to the States. We might imagine the possibility of a
reinvigorated grand jury, fulfilling the roles and performing the
functions that compelled the Framers to include the right to grand jury
indictment in the Fifth Amendment in the first place. Certainly, the
Court's decision to incorporate the only remaining criminal procedural
protection in the Bill of Rights not applicable to the States could prompt
a sea change in how the grand jury is utilized in our criminal legal
system and perceived in our culture. However, regardless of how the
Court is likely to decide the question, even the exercise of interrogating
the merits of incorporation could provide the catalyst for a reimagining
of the ancient bulwark of liberty.

384 See, e.g., Marina Bell, Abolition: A New Paradigmfor Reform, 46 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 32
(2021); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1613 (2019);
Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2018); Alexandra Natapoff,
MisdemeanorDecriminalization,68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015).
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